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The relative susceptibility of individuals and groups to systematic judgmental biases is considered. 
An overview of the relevant empirical literature reveals no clear or general pattern. However, a theo- 
retical analysis employing J. H. Davis's (1973) social decision scheme (SDS) model reveals that he 
relative magnitude ofindividual and group bias depends upon several factors, including roup size, 
initial individual judgment, he magnitude ofbias among individuals, the type of bias, and most of 
all, the group-judgment process. It is concluded that here can be no simple answer to the question, 
"Which are more biased, individuals or groups?," but the SDS model offers a framework for specify- 
ing some of the conditions under which individuals are both more and less biased than groups. 
A great deal of research in social and cognitive psychology 
has been devoted to demonstrating what is probably an uncon- 
troversial proposition: that human judgment isimperfect. What 
makes this work interesting and useful is that such imperfec- 
tions often constitute more than random fluctuations around 
"rational," prescribed, or ideal judgments. Rather, humans con- 
sistently exhibit systematic biases in their judgments. Some of 
these biases eem to stem from self-enhancing or self-protective 
motives (e.g., Greenwald, 1980; Myers, 1980). Others may stem 
from general cognitive shortcuts or heuristics (e.g., Kahneman, 
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Still others eem to reflect an inap- 
propriate sensitivity or insensitivity ocertain types of informa- 
tion (e.g., underuse of base-rate information; Kahneman et al., 
1982; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Regardless of their sources, sys- 
tematic judgmental biases can have serious consequences (cf. 
Dawes, 1988; Thaler, 1991 ), and identifying means of control- 
ling such biases is an important challenge for psychology. 
These questions have largely been the province of scholars of 
cognition, social cognition, and judgment and decision making, 
all of whom have understandably focused primarily upon the 
behavior of the individual judge. However, in many important 
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instances, the judges who are potentially vulnerable tosuch sys- 
tematic biases are groups rather than individuals. For example, 
typically juries (not individual jurors) must decide guilt or in- 
nocence; Congress (not individual lawmakers) must declare 
war; boards of directors (not individual directors) must decide 
corporate policy. In this article, we (as social psychologists) ex- 
plore the following question: Are decision-making groups any 
less (or more) subject to judgmental biases than individual de- 
cision makers? For example, might we expect deliberating juries 
to be any less (or more) sensitive than individual jurors to pro- 
scribed extralegal information, such as the race of a victim? Our 
goal is to shed light on when groups are more biased than indi- 
viduals, when individuals are more biased than groups, and 
most importantly, whether and why there are patterns in such 
comparisons. 
We begin by discussing the concept of judgmental bias and 
advancing a simple taxonomy of bias effects. We then present 
an overview of the relevant empirical literature: namely, those 
studies that compare individual and group susceptibility to par- 
ticular types of bias. This overview ill demonstrate that there 
is no simple and general pattern in the literature. We then sug- 
gest that formal models that link individual and group judg- 
ment can usefully be applied to a theoretical nalysis of this 
question. Davis' ( 1973 )social decision scheme (SDS) model of 
group decision making is proposed as a promising basis for such 
an analysis. The parameters of the SDS model are then linked 
conceptually to information processing by individuals and by 
groups (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, in press). A small set of 
generic group-judgment processes are then identified from past 
theory and research using the SDS model. The effects of each of 
these processes for each type of bias are then explored within a 
series of"thought experiments" (Davis & Kerr, 1986), in which 
a number of variables of interest (e.g., group size; magnitude of
ind,_'vidual bias) are systematically manipulated. When feasible, 
these thought experiments are augmented with relevant empir- 
ical illustrations of predicted patterns. Finally, an additional 
source of individual-group differences in biased judgment is 
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identified (and illustrated in prior research )--instances in 
which possession of certain information alters the group deci- 
sion-making process itself. 
Bias and Its Varieties 
Defining (Systematic) Bias 
We begin by defining what we mean by biased judgment. The 
concept of biased judgment assumes that one can specify anon- 
biased standard of judgment against which actual human judg- 
ments can be compared (Funder, 1987; Hastie & Rasinski, 
1988 ). The basis of that standard, the normative model of judg- 
ment, may be some formal ogical system (e.g., syllogistic logic, 
probability theory, game theory, rational choice models). How- 
ever, the normative model may also be based on convention. 
Good examples of the latter types of standards are the common 
law rules of evidence that proscribe jurors' use of certain in- 
formation (e.g., a defendant's race or gender or physical 
appearance). It is not our purpose here to defend any particular 
normative models of judgment as ideal or unbiased nor is it to 
propose conditions for such normative models that are gener- 
ally necessary or sufficient (see Hastie & Rasinski, 1988, for a 
discussion of related issues). Rather, we focus on a number of 
judgmental phenomena for which there are both reasonable and 
defensible normative models and convincing empirical demon- 
strations of bias, and we address the theoretical nd empirical 
issue of whether individuals or groups are relatively more likely 
to exhibit hose biases. 
Our focus will be on systematic departures from a standard 
of judgment (i.e., patterned or orderly deviations from the nor- 
mative standard; Einhorn, Hogarth, & Klempner, 1977; Funder, 
1987 ). Thus, we will not be concerned here with individual ver- 
sus group differences in the magnitude of unsystematic random 
error, in the consistency with which valid cues are applied or in 
ability to learn from diagnostic feedback (e.g., see Chalos & 
Pickard, 1985; Davis, Kerr, Sussmann, & Rissman, 1974; Einh- 
orn et al., 1977; Laughlin & Shippy, 1983; Laughlin & Sweeney, 
1977; Zajonc, 1962). 
A Taxonomy of Systematic Biases 
Hastie and Rasinski (1988) suggest that there are several dis- 
tinctive logics for establishing a systematic bias in judgment. 
Their taxonomy of bias differs from others in the literature in 
that it distinguishes methods for demonstrating bias, rather 
than task domains (e.g., Pelham & Neter's, 1995, distinction 
between biases in persuasion vs. person perception vs. judgment 
under uncertainty) or the psychological origins of biases (e.g., 
Arkes', 1991, distinction among strategy-based, association- 
based, and psychophysically based errors). In this article, we 
will be concerned with three of Hastie and Rasinski's types of 
bias. 
Judgmental Sins of Imprecision 
The first and most straightforward type of bias is revealed by 
a direct comparison between judgment and criterion. A famil- 
iar example is research demonstrating that judges rarely alter 
their subjective probability judgments as much in response to 
new, diagnostic, and probabilistic information as Bayes' theo- 
rem prescribes (Edwards, 1968 ). Another example (of which 
we will make repeated use later) comes from research on pros- 
pect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Participants are 
asked to choose between two courses of action with identical 
expected values (under an assumption of a linear utility func- 
tion, such that the value of the n'th unit gained or lost is equal 
to the value of the first such unit). Unbiased judgment should 
result in indifference between the two choices. However, Kah- 
neman & Tversky (e.g., 1984) have shown that this choice is 
biased by the way in which the choices are described or 
"framed"; for example, participants generally preferred Choice 
A with uncertain loss to Choice B with certain loss, but also 
prefer Choice C with certain gain over Choice D with uncertain 
gain (or, to use the customary terminology, participants seem 
to be risk seeking when the outcomes are framed as losses and 
to be risk averse when the outcomes are framed as gains). The 
magnitude of such a bias in judgment might be indexed by how 
much more popular Choice A was (e.g., percentage of partici- 
pants choosing A) than the prescribed baseline (viz., partici- 
pants preferred Choice A 50% of the time, indicative of in- 
difference between A and B). Unbiased judgment in this exam- 
ple prescribes a specific and precise use of available information 
(viz., computation and comparison of expected utilities); bi- 
ased judgment reflects systematic departure from this pre- 
scribed and precise use of information. For this reason, we will 
term this type of bias a judgmental sin of imprecision (SofI; 
Hastie & Rasinski, 1988, refer to such a contrast as a "direct 
assessment ofcriterion-judgment relationship"). 
At this point, we might introduce some useful notation. Let 
us suppose that the judgment task posed to individuals requires 
participants o choose among n possible responses. For exam- 
ple, in the prospect theory paradigm just discussed, researchers 
asked participants o choose between two outcomes (one cer- 
tain and the other uncertain). We shall denote the distribution 
of individual judgments or decisions across these n alternatives 
with the vectorp = (p~, P2 . . . .  , p,) .  In order for investigators 
to document that a judgmental sin of imprecision has occurred 
among individual judges, they must first specify how the judg- 
ments of perfectly unbiased individuals hould be distributed. 
We shall denote this ideal criterion distribution as I ;  for exam- 
ple, in our prospect heory example, / = (.5, .5). Unbiased 
judgment would require that (within the limits of sampling 
error)p = I;  when p 4: I ,  bias would be indicated. In the latter 
case, the magnitude of the bias displayed by individual judges 
(b) could simply be indexed by b = IP - 11, where IP - II 
denotes the length of vector (p - I ) .  (Of course, the direction 
in which judges depart from the criterion may also be important 
in understanding the causes of the biased judgment, but a sim- 
ple scalar index of the magnitude of bias will be sufficient for 
the purposes of this article.) Thus, the assertion that individuals 
exhibit a sin of imprecision would require evidence justifying a
rejection of the null hypothesis H0: b = 0. 
Now, in a like manner, we could ask r-person groups to per- 
form the identical judgment task (e.g., we could ask 4-person 
groups to choose between certain and uncertain losses). Using 
upper-case l tters to denote group variables, the magnitude of 
bias among group judges (B) would just be B = I P - I I ,  where 
P = (P1, P2 . . . . .  Pn), the distribution of group judgments. Our 
BIAS IN INDIVIDUALS VERSUS GROUPS 689 
primary interest in this paper is estimating and explaining the 
relative magnitude of individual and group bias. This may be 
indexed by RB = relative bias = B - b. When RB = 0, then 
groups and individuals exhibit an identical degree of bias. When 
RB > 0, groups are relatively more biased than individual 
judges; and when RB < 0, groups are relatively less biased than 
individuals. 
J udgmenta l  S ins  o f  Commiss ion  
A key feature of a sin of imprecision isthat the no-bias crite- 
rion is defined theoretically and the magnitude ofbias is defined 
by the discrepancy between that criterion and human judg- 
mentJ The other two types of bias that we will consider use an 
empirical rather than a theoretical no-bias criterion. In one 
such type of bias, which we will term a judgmental sin of com- 
mission (SofC; and Hastie & Rasinski, 1988, call "use a bad 
cue"), the model of ideal, unbiased judgment holds that certain 
information is irrelevant or nondiagnostic forthe required judg- 
ment. For example, the rules of evidence usually require that an 
unbiased juror pay no attention to a victim's race or a defen- 
dant's physical attractiveness in deciding whether or not the de- 
fendant is guilty. Bias is manifest when jurors use such informa- 
tion. This typically involves comparison ofa condition in which 
the potentially biasing information is provided (e.g., jurors 
considering a stimulus trial with a physically attractive defen- 
dant) with a control condition in which either this informa- 
tion is missing (e.g., no information provided on defendant 
attractiveness) or different information is provided ( e.g., the de- 
fendant is physically unattractive). We might call the former, 
experimental condition the high-bias condition and the latter, 
control condition the low-bias condition. A sin of commission 
has occurred when the judgments in these two conditions differ 
significantly. 
Extending our earlier notation, a sin of commission by indi- 
vidual judges requires that the judgments of individuals in the 
high- (H) and low- (L) bias conditions differ, that is, PH 4= PL 
(where PH and Pt are the distributions of individual judgments 
in the high- and low-bias conditions, respectively) and, hence, 
that b = [ p ,  - pL [ be greater than zero. A corresponding bias 
among roups would mean that Pn 4~ PL (where PH and Pt  are 
the distributions ofgroup judgments in the high- and low-bias 
conditions, respectively) and that B = I PH - PLI > 0. Again, in 
this article we are primarily interested inthe relative magnitude 
of individual and group bias, RB = B - b. 
It is worth noting that sins of imprecision can be documented 
using a sin of commission methodology. For example, rather 
than establishing the prospect heory's risk-seeking bias by 
comparing the popularity of the risky alternative with a chance, 
50% baseline, one might instead compare the level of preference 
for the risky alternative in a condition using a loss frame with 
the same preference ina second condition utilizing again frame 
(e.g., see McGuire, Kiesler, & Siegel, 1987). This alters the 
goodness-of-fit statistical logic used when establishing a sin of 
imprecision to the more typical null hypothesis testing statisti- 
cal logic used when establishing the other two types of judg- 
mental sins (Hastie & Rasinski, 1988; Meehl, 1990). We note 
all this because, as wewill show later, how one decides to dem- 
onstrate bias can affect the comparison of individual and group 
bias. 
J udgmenta l  S ins  o f  Omiss ion  
We will term the third and final type of bias a sin of  omission 
(SofO; what Hastie & Rasinski, 1988, call "miss a good cue"). 
This occurs when the judge fails to use information held to be 
diagnostic by the idealized model of judgment. For example, 
many studies have shown that judges frequently fail to use diag- 
nostic base-rate information (see Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Like- 
wise, people also tend to ignore situational constraints when ex- 
plaining an actor's behavior (the correspondence bias, see Nis- 
bett & Ross, 1980); for example, participants who read a 
written essay tend to ignore whether or not the writer chose vol- 
untarily to take that position versus was randomly assigned that 
position when judging the writer's true feelings on the essay's 
topic (Jones & Harris, 1967). 
A sin of omission has occurred when conditions differing on 
the availability of such useful information fail to produce reli- 
ably different judgments (e.g., no difference in judgment be- 
tween participants given different levels of base-rate infor- 
mation). If we again refer to conditions difli~ring in the avail- 
ability of this prescribed information as the high and low con- 
ditions, then a sin of omission by individual judges requires that 
Pu = PL (where Pu and PL are the distributions of individual 
judgments in the high and low conditions, respectively). Since 
it is the absence of an effect hat signifies bias for this type of sin, 
the magnitude ofdifferences injudgment between these condi- 
tions (i.e., b = I PH - ptJ ) serves to index not the magnitude of
bias, but rather a lack of bias. So for a sin of omission to obtain, 
b = 0. Likewise, a sin of omission among groups would mean 
that P~ = PL and, thus, that B = [ Pn - Pt  I should be zero. The 
reversal from the logic of detecting sins of commission requires 
that we reverse the terms in the definition of the relative magni- 
tude of a SofO bias. That is, for sins of omission, RB = b - B 
(instead ofB - b, as in the SofI and SofC cases). When relative 
bias for the SofO case is defined in this way, positive values of 
relative bias still signify that groups are relatively more biased 
than individualsfl 
The criterion eed not necessarily bea specific point value. For ex- 
ample, the conj unction error (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) is indicated 
by a judgment falling anywhere above a maximum value specified by 
probability theory. 
2 In the text, we have made tbe simplifying assumption that he larger 
the difference between the high- and low-bias conditions, the more "ac- 
curate" judges are ( i.e., the more appropriately they are using the avail- 
able information ). Of course, theoretically it is possible to specify not 
only that certain information should be used, but precisely how much of 
an impact such information should have. For example, not only should 
judges pay attention to base-rate information, but using certain orma- 
tive models (e.g., Bayes' theorem), it is possible to specify exactly how 
much impact any particular piece of base-rate information should have. 
In such a case, it is also possible that bias could be revealed by judges 
paying too much attention to the information i  question as well as too 
little. In such a case, one could not simply assume that the larger RB 
was, the more biased groups were relative to individuals. However, this 
theoretical complication does not negate the thrust of the present anal- 
ysis (which makes the simplifying assumption that the more one uses 
prescribed information, the better). 
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Other Conceptions of Bias 
Because theory and research on judgmental bias has grown so 
explosively over the past two decades, some further taxonomic 
distinctions will help bound our coverage of the topic. 
First, we have excluded from our analysis a fourth logic for 
demonstrating bias described by Hastie and Rasinski ( 1988 ). 
This logic involves a comparison of the judgments reached by 
two or more sets of judges (e.g., men and women). In tasks 
where a single unbiased judgment can be assumed, reliable 
differences injudgment between such sets of judges implies that 
at least one of them is inaccurate (i.e., biased). In our present 
context, this logic can be readily generalized to comparisons of
judgments by sets of groups instead of sets of individuals. 
This logic may be used to examine what Kaplan and Miller 
( 1978 ) call trait biases, that is, biases attributable to some sta- 
ble characteristic or disposition of the judge. For example, 
mock jury studies have compared verdicts reached by sets of 
jurors classified as high versus low on traits like authoritarian- 
ism (Bray & Noble, 1978) or on prior beliefs about the proba- 
bility that any given rape defendant is guilty (Davis, Spitzer, 
Nagao, & Stasser, 1978 ). 
This fourth logic can be useful for probing the nature and 
consequences of traits, but we exclude it from our present anal- 
yses of bias because of its inherent inferential ambiguity. The 
mere fact that judgments by two or more sets of judges are reli- 
ably different is typically insufficient to unambiguously estab- 
lish that nonnormative use of information has occurred. It is 
often possible, for example, that the judgment processes of the 
sets of judges differ in ways permitted by or irrelevant to the 
normative model of judgment. For example, jurors have broad 
discretion in evaluating the credibility of witnesses. Sex differ- 
ences in trial verdict could simply reflect sex differences in the 
perceived credibility of a key witness, an effect that might not 
violate any normative model of juror judgment. Moreover, even 
if such problems could be avoided (e.g., by using tasks where 
the normative model prescribes that and how all available in- 
formation is used), the locus of bias remains ambiguous under 
this logic; disagreement between two sets of judges could mean 
that one, the other, or both are making biased judgments. Thus, 
in the remainder of this article, we limit our analysis to cases 
involving the other three Hastie-Rasinski (1988) logics or what 
we have labeled judgmental sins of imprecision, commission, 
and omission. 
An additional distinction involves group composition: spe- 
cifically, the degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity in the 
group. Though group homogeneity often refers to the distribu- 
tion of a personality or demographic trait across members, for 
our purposes it is defined with respect to exposure to informa- 
tion. Thus a homogeneous group is one in which each member 
of a group has been exposed to the same prescribed, proscribed, 
or neutral information set, although members may nevertheless 
differ with respect to their attention, encoding, and recall of that 
information. In a heterogeneous group, members differ quanti- 
tatively in their amount of exposure to the stimulus or qualita- 
tively in the particular biasing stimuli to which they have been 
exposed (e.g., Kameda & Davis, 1990; Tindale, Sheffey, & 
Scott, 1993). Although we limit our analysis to cases involving 
homogeneous groups, at the conclusion of the article we briefly 
examine how heterogeneous grouping might influence the indi- 
vidual-group comparison (see Kerr & Huang, 1986; Tindale & 
Nagao, 1986). 
Furthermore, our analysis does not address other senses in 
which individual and group decision processes may be more or 
less biased; for example, with respect o the representation f 
diverse viewpoints in the community, the perceived fairness of 
decision rules and the perceived legitimacy of the decision mak- 
er's mandate (see MacCoun & Tyler, 1988). We also limit our 
review and analysis to the potentially moderating effects of dis- 
cussion in face-to-face small groups. Thus, we exclude the grow- 
ing body of research in the experimental market paradigm, 
which examines the effects of simulated market ransactions on 
the rationality of individual choice (see reviews by Camerer, 
1992; Plott, 1986). Two characteristics generally distinguish 
that paradigm from the small-group aradigm examined here: 
In the former, judges generally make repeated individual 
choices without explicit group discussion, and they receive feed- 
back on the effects of their choices, although that feedback is 
often lagged, noisy, and highly interdependent on the influences 
of other judges and exogenous factors (see the essays in Hogarth, 
1990). 
Finally, although this article's focus is upon biased use of in- 
formation, it is important to recognize that there is nothing in 
our analysis of sins of omission or commission that requires this 
limitation. That is, our primary question could be rephrased 
from "are groups any less (or more) subject o SofC or SolO 
judgmental biases than individuals?" to "are groups any less 
(or more) likely to use a particular piece of information than 
individuals?" 3 Our presentation is couched within the frame- 
work of biased judgment (i.e., proscribed use of information), 
but it is worth remembering that the same analysis can be ap- 
plied with profit to comparing unbiased judgment by individu- 
als and groups. We return to this important point later. 
Summary 
Three qualitatively different forms of judgmental bias have 
been distinguished: ifferences between judgment and a partic- 
ular judgment prescribed by a normative model (a sin of 
imprecision); differences in response to the availability of in- 
formation that should be ignored by judges (a sin of 
commission); and failures to observe differences in judgment 
due to the availability of information that should be used by 
judges (a sin of omission). 
In the following section we provide an overview of the rele- 
vant empirical literature, cross-categorized by the three types 
of bias defined above. This taxonomy of biases, per se, does not 
simply organize that literature. It is not the case, for example, 
that groups tend generally to be more biased than individuals 
for one type of bias, but less biased for another. However, distin- 
guishing between these different types of bias is very useful for 
our subsequent theoretical analyses and for fitting particular 
empirical findings within those analyses. 
3 Thanks to Reid Hastie for making this important point. 
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Overview of  Relevant Prior Research 
Coverage 
Several review essays have done an excellent job of comparing 
individual and group performance on various decision tasks 
(see Einhorn et al., 1977; Hastie, 1986; Hill, 1987; Laughlin & 
Ellis, 1986; McGrath, 1984; Vollrath, Sheppard, Hinsz, & 
Davis, 1989). The general consensus i  that, on average, groups 
outperform individuals on such tasks, although groups typically 
fall short of the performance of their highest-ability members. 
These reviews have generally equated the quality of perfor- 
mance with accuracy, defined in terms of the distance between 
individual or group judgments and a value (e.g., judgments of 
weight or distance, arithmetic problems), what we have called 
sins of imprecision (see Hastie, 1986; Hastie & Rasinski, 
1988). The accuracy criterion is most applicable to what 
Laughlin (e.g., Laughlin & Ellis, 1986) calls intellective tasks; 
that is, tasks where clear criteria exist for evaluating the quality 
of cognitive performance. But whether a task can be character- 
ized as intellective depends on several factors: the existence of a 
normative theory of the task, the degree to which knowledge of 
the theory is shared by group members, and the degree to which 
the theory, once voiced, is accepted as valid by group members 
(Laughlin & Ellis, 1986; McGrath, 1984). Where previous re- 
views have focused primarily on tasks that are unambiguously 
intellective (e.g., arithmetic problems, deductive brain teasers, 
simple recognition and recall memory) most of the studies we 
review fall within a "grey area" marking the transition from 
pure intellective tasks to pure decision-making (McGrath, 
1984) or judgmental (Laughlin & Ellis, 1986) tasks: tasks that 
have no demonstrably correct answer. Of course, when bias is a 
sin of commission or omission, it is not necessary that a task be 
clearly intellective. Bias can be demonstrated without recourse 
to a correct answer by comparing the performance of decision 
makers operating under alternative xperimental conditions 
that should or should not, in a normative sense, influence out- 
comes. Besides their recurrence in the literature, what makes 
such studies interesting is that, in keeping with the quasi-intel- 
lective nature of their tasks, the normative standards for iden- 
tifying bias may not be readily obvious to all decision makers. 
Methodological Caveats 
Comparisons of statistical significance l vels across levels of 
analysis--individual versus group--can be hazardous. In many 
repeated-measures studies, the sample size at the group level of 
analysis is only ( 1/r)th as large as the individual-level sample 
size, where r is the group size. This implies that group-level 
effects will generally be tested at a much lower level of statistical 
power, and thus reliable individual effects might not be detected 
at the group level even when of equal or greater magnitude 
(Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, in press). Thus, differential statistical 
power can artifactually make groups appear less biased than in- 
dividuals with respect to sins of commission, where a null find- 
ing implies the absence of bias. It can make groups appear more 
biased than individuals with respect to sins of omission, where 
a null finding implies the presence of bias. 
Ideally, one might compensate for studies with low statistical 
power by conducting a meta-analysis ofthe effects of group dis- 
cussion on particular judgmental biases, but that goal seemed 
neither feasible nor appropriate given the paucity of available 
data. We have been able to locate fewer than 30 different empir- 
ical studies that directly examined both individual- and group- 
level biases. Across these studies, there is little consistency in
decision tasks, procedures, group sizes, independent variables, 
dependent measures, and inferential statistical tests; in such 
cases, meta-analyses could not only be inappropriate, but quite 
misleading. Moreover, studies varied in their implementation f 
the individual-group comparison. In some studies, participants 
were randomly assigned to either an individual or a group con- 
dition in a between-subjects design, while other studies com- 
pared prediscussion, group-level, and postdiscussion judgments 
in a repeated-measures d ign. Many of these studies failed to 
report either explicit statistical tests of the individual-group 
comparison or the information eeded to conduct such tests. 
Finally, our theoretical analysis, presented later, suggests that 
existing research provides quite spotty coverage of the relevant 
parameter space; as such, overgeneralization from observed em- 
pirical patterns provides a potentially misleading comparison 
of individual and group bias. 
An Overview of Relevant Research 
In Table 1, we use our trichotomous bias taxonomy (i.e., sins 
of commission, omission, or imprecision) to categorize the ex- 
isting literature on individual versus group bias. We should em- 
phasize that such a categorization is quite broad and almost 
certainly glosses over important psychological distinctions 
among judgmental phenomena. Indeed, the taxonomy's imme- 
diate purpose is to categorize experimental operations; whether 
it also categorizes distinct psychological process is an open ques- 
tion we explore throughout the article. 
Across the three general types of bias we distinguish 15 judg- 
mental phenomena that (a) seem to produce bias among indi- 
viduals and (b) have been studied so as to permit some compar- 
ison of the relative susceptibility of individuals and groups to 
that bias. Eight of these can be classified as judgmental sins of 
commission: framing bias (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981 ); preference r versals (i.e., incon- 
sistencies in judgment across alternative ways of obtaining judg- 
ments; e.g., Lichtenstein & Slovic, 197 l; Tversky, Sattath, & 
Slovic, 1988); theory-perseverance eff cts (i.e., overreliance on 
information that might once have been but is no longer diag- 
nostic; e.g., Anderson, Lopper, & Ross, 1980; Nisbett & Ross, 
1980); oversensitivity toirretrievable, "sunk" costs (e.g., Arkes 
& Blumer, 1985; Brockner & Rubin, 1985); jurors' use of le- 
gally irrelevant, extraevidentary information (see Dane & 
Wrightsman, 1982); nonindependence of judgments by jurors 
in trials with multiple, joined charges (e.g., Greene & Loftus, 
1985 ); biasing effects on juror judgment of spurious attorney 
arguments (e.g., Wells, Miene, & Wrightsman, 1985 ); and the 
hindsight bias (e.g., Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). Three more phe- 
nomena can be classified as judgmental sins of omission: insen- 
sitivity to base-rate information (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & 
Tversky, 1982); underuse of situational information when 
making behavioral attributions, variously termed the disp0si- 
tional bias, correspondence bias, or the fundamental ttribution 
error (e.g., Jones & Harris, 1967; Nisbett & Ross, 1980); and 
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Table 1 
Classification and Summary  of  Empirical Literature 
Phenomenon Studies General effect of discussion 
Sin of commission 
Framing 
Preference reversal 
Theory-perseverance eff ct 
Weighing sunk costs 
Extraevidentiary bias in juror 
judgments 
Joinder bias in juror judgments 
Biasing effect of spurious attorney 
arguments 
Hindsight bias 
Tindale et al. ( 1993)~ I 
Kameda & Davis ( 1990)Q~ 
McGuire et al. ( 1987)~ 
Paese et al. (1993) 
Neale et al. (1986)+ 
Mowen & Gentry (1980)t 
Irwin & Davis ( 1995)~ 
Wright & Christie ( 1990)~ 2
Whyte (1993)t 
Bray, Struckman-Johnson, Osborne, 
McFarlane, & Scott (1978)Z~ 2 
Carretta & Moreland (1983)~3~2? l 
Hans & Doob ( 1976)I' 
lzzett & Leginski (1974)~Z~ 2'3
Kaplan & Miller ( 1978)~, 
Kerwin & Shaffer (1994)~* 
Kramer et al. (1990) t 
MacCoun (1990)~ 
Thompson et al. ( 1981 )
Zanzola (1977) t 
Tanford & Penrod (1984)~ 
Davis et al. ( 1984)~ 
Schumman & Thompson (1989)~ 
Stahlberg, Eller, Maass, & Frey ( 1995)~ 
Mixed: Group discussion amplified bias in McGuire et al., 
attenuated bias in Neale et al., no effect in Paese t al. 
Mixed: Groups more susceptible to choice/rank reversals but 
less susceptible to choice/match reversals than individuals. 
Attenuation: Theory-perseverance eff ct eliminated in group- 
discussion and yoked-transcript conditions (but see Note ~2). 
Amplification: Groups were more influenced by the existence of 
past, sunk costs than individuals. 
Mixed: Amplification is more common than attenuation. 
Mixed: No clear effect of group discussion. 
Amplification: Groups more susceptible than individuals. 
Attenuation: Groups lightly less susceptible than individuals. 
Insensitivity to base rates 
Dispositional bias in attributions 
Underuse of consensus 
information i  attributions 
Sin of omission 
Argote, Seabright, & Dyer ( 1986)t ?2 
Argote, Devadas, & Melone (1990)~? 2'3 
Nagao, Tindale, Hinsz, & Davis ( 1985)$? 2 
Wright & Wells ( 1985)~ 
Wittenbaum & Stasser ( 1995)~ 
Wright et al. ( 1990)+ 
Mixed: Good evidence that groups rely more heavily on 
individuating information, but no direct evidence that they 
rely less on base-rate information (and some to the contrary; 
see ?3), 
Attenuation: Appears that group discussion attenuates 
dispositional bias. 
Attenuation: Only group participants were affected by 
consensus information. 
Conjunction error 
Use of representativeness heuristic 
Use of availability heuristic 
Overconfidence (miscalibration) 
Sin of imprecision 
Tindale, Sheffey, & Filkins ( 1990)$ 
Tindale, Filkins, Thomas, & Smith (1993)$ 
Stasson, Ono, Zim merman, & Davis (1988)-$ 
Stasson et al. (1987)~ 
Dunning & Ross ( 1992)~ 
Sniezek & Henry (1989)~ 
Plous( 1995)~ 
Mixed: Groups made more conjunction errors than individuals 
when individual error rates were high, but fewer when 
individual error ates were low. 
Amplification? Individuals outperformed groups on one 
problem; no difference for second problem. 
Attenuation?: Groups (especially when unanimous) marginally 
out-performed individuals. 
Mixed: Groups are generally more confident than individuals, 
but whether this reflects overconfidence varies between 
studies. 
Note. Amplification signifies a stronger bias among roups (or following group discussion) than among individuals (i.e., RB > 0). Attenuation signifies a 
weaker bias among roups (or following group discussion) than among individuals, RB < 0. Mixed signifies an inconsistent pattern of findings, such that for 
certain studies or analyses RB > 0, for others RB < O. 
t signifies that group discussion amplified individual bias. 
signifies that group discussion reduced or corrected individual bias. 
$ signifies that there were results indicating that group discussion both amplified and corrected individual bias. 
signifies that the magnitude of bias was comparable for individual and group judges. 
signifies that although the study employed both individual and group judges and examined the bias phenomenon, the study's results are not informative for 
assessing the degree of relative bias for one of the following reasons: 
~ Groups were not homogeneous with respect to exposure to potentially biasing information. 
~2 No clear bias effect for individuals for key dependent variables. 
~3 Bias observed only on dependent variable for which purported biasing information isnot normatively proscribed. 
~4 The experimental design did not include a low-bias condition. 
Overstruck (e.g., g) or paired (e.g. ~ =)  symbols ignify combinations of the preceding conditions. 
Symbols accompanied byquestion marks (?) reflect he following methodological or other ambiguities that cloud interpretation f the results: 
?J Results might be attributed to differential power of statistical tests (d)%or = 255 for individual bias tests but df~rror = 30 for group tests). 
?2 Groups were more prone to use individuating information than individuals, a result hat was interpreted as indicating that groups were also less sensitive to 
base-rate information. However, if the individuating information isdiagnostic, one could alternatively conclude that groups make better use of this diagnostic 
information. 
?3 Access to base-rate information manipulated. When the individuating information was not diagnostic, groups were more likely to use base-rate information; 
when such information was diagnostic, no reliable effects on relative bias were observed. 
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underuse of consensus information in attribution (i.e., ignoring 
information about he proportion of people behaving similarly 
in a given situation; e.g., Nisbett & Borgida, 1975). Finally, 4 
phenomena can be classified as judgmental sins of imprecision: 
the conjunction error (i.e., when the subjective probability of 
the conjunction of two events exceeds the minimum of the 
probabilities of the two isolated events; e.g., Tversky & Kahne- 
man, 1983); use of the representativeness heuristic (i.e., over- 
reliance on some representative or salient, but non-informative, 
feature of available information; e.g., Kahneman et al., 1982); 
use of the availability heuristic (i.e., overreliance on informa- 
tion that is readily available; e.g., Kahneman et al., 1982); and 
overconfidence in own accuracy at all but the most difficult 
problems (e.g., Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982; Dun- 
ning, Griffin, Milojkovic, & Ross, 1990). 
In Table 1 we list all those studies that we could identify that 
made an individual versus group comparison for each of these 
! 5 biases. Unfortunately, certain features of a number of these 
studies made their results either uninformative or uninterpret- 
able for assessing the degree of relative bias; the nature of these 
problems are described briefly in the table's footnotes. For each 
study, the relative degree of bias observed for group versus indi- 
vidual judges is summarized. The table reveals another unfor- 
tunate reality: frequently (viz., for 7 of the 15 bias phenomena), 
there is only one study making the key comparison. 
Close inspection of Table 1 does not suggest a simple or co- 
herent picture of the effects of group discussion on biases of 
judgment. There are several demonstrations that group discus- 
sion can attenuate, amplify, or simply reproduce the judg- 
mental biases of individuals. And, although group amplification 
of bias seems to be the modal result, none of these three patterns 
appears predominant. Thus, research conducted to date indi- 
cates that there is unlikely to be any simple, global answer to the 
question, "Is group judgment more or less biased than individ- 
ual j udgment?" 
In the face of such inconsistent findings, an obvious explana- 
tion might be that the effect of group discussion on relative bias 
is moderated by the nature of the judgmental bias under study. 
We are convinced that differences among general varieties of 
bias as well as specific bias phenomena must play an important 
role in an analysis of relative bias. The remainder of this article 
is largely devoted to justifying this conviction. Table I suggests 
that our trichotomous bias categorization alone cannot resolve 
the empirical discrepancies documented in the literature. It is 
not the case, for example, that groups generally attenuate sins 
of commission but amplify sins of omission, or vice versa. 
Rather, for each of these two categories, we find examples of 
group attenuation and examples of group amplification. 
Likewise, comparison and contrast of the studies summa- 
rized in Table 1 do not suggest (to us, anyway) any simple task 
moderators that can organize this diverse literature. For exam- 
ple, two studies of decision framing suggest that groups are even 
more susceptible to framing than individuals (McGuire et al., 
1987; Paese, Bieser, & Tubbs, 1993), yet another finds just the 
opposite pattern (Neale, Bazerman, Northcrafl, & Alperson, 
1986). Most studies find that jury deliberation accentuates the 
effects of extra-evidentiary attributes of trial participants, al- 
though one study (Kaplan & Miller, 1978) finds that it attenu- 
ates extralegal bias. 
No doubt, ad hoc explanations for these discrepancies could 
be developed, invoking more subtle differences in tasks, proce- 
dures, or experimental design. But we believe that a more pro- 
ductive approach would be to start from first principles, build- 
ing from established and verified theoretical principles regard- 
ing the processes by which individual responses are integrated 
into group judgments. In the following sections, we pursue such 
a strategy. 
A Theoretical Analysis o f  the Relative Bias 
of  Individuals Versus Groups 
Why should groups be any more (or less) susceptible to judg- 
mental biases than individuals? There have been a handful of 
attempts to provide a theoretical basis for an answer to this 
question, most in the context of juror versus jury decision mak- 
ing (e.g., Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; Myers & Kaplan, 1976). Most 
of these imply that bias should be stronger in groups than 
among individuals (although, see Kaplan & Miller, 1978, for a 
striking exception). 
An Introductory Overview of the 
Social Decision Scheme (SDS) Model 
Our approach to this theoretical problem is to use a formal 
model that links the product of individual judgment o the 
product of group judgment. Several such models have been de- 
veloped specifically for jury decision making (e.g., Gelfand & 
Solomon, 1974; Klevorick & Rothschild, 1979; Penrod & Has- 
tie, 1980). There are also some more general models that have 
been applied not just to juries but to other group decision tasks 
as well (e.g., Davis, 1973, 1980; Hoffman, 1979; Vinokur & 
Burnstein, 1973). Here we use one particularly influential 
model of the latter type--Davis' (1973, 1980) social decision 
scheme (SDS) model. (See Stasser, Kerr, & Davis, 1989, for a 
general introduction to the SDS model and its progeny; Davis, 
1996; Kerr, 1981, 1982; Stasser & Davis, 1981 .) 
The SDS model suggests hat the preferences ofgroup mem- 
bers can be related to group decisions through simple functions, 
termed social decision schemes. A familiar example is a major- 
ity-rules decision scheme, which predicts that the group ulti- 
mately settles on the alternative initially favored by a majority 
of group members. Of course, some groups may not have an 
absolute majority favoring an alternative at the beginning of de- 
liberation. To deal with such cases, not handled by the primary 
scheme, one must often posit some subscheme or subschemes 
(e.g., plurality wins; averaging) along with the primary decision 
scheme so that all possible distributions of initial preferences 
are accounted for. 
Decision scheme~ need not be deterministic, predicting one 
particular group decision with certainty. Rather, they can (and 
usually are) probabilistic rules. For example, groups occasion- 
ally seem to operate under an equiprobability decision scheme 
for which all alternatives with at least one advocate have an 
equal chance of being selected as the group decision (e.g., John- 
son & Davis, 1972). 
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Formally, a social decision scheme is a m × n stochastic ma- 
trix D, where n = the number of decision or judgment alterna- 
tives and m = the number of  possible distributions of r group 
members across the n decision alternatives. It can be shown (see 
Davis, 1973) that 
m=(n+r-1)  (n+r -1) , r  , (n -  1), (1) 
For example, a 12-person jury making a guilty-not guilty 
choice can be distributed in 13 [ = ( 12 + 2 - 1 ) ! / ( 12! 1 ! ) ] pos- 
sible ways, namely, (12G, 0NG),  ( l lG ,  1NG) . . . .  (0G, 
12NG). The di) element of the D matrix specifies the probabil- 
ity that a group beginning deliberation with the ith possible dis- 
tribution of member preference will ultimately choose the j th  
decision alternative. Table 2 presents ome possible social deci- 
sion schemes for I l-person groups choosing between 2 alterna- 
tives. (We will soon have more to say about these particular de- 
cision schemes.) 
All that is required to formally link the distribution of  indi- 
vidual j udgments or decisions, (p~, P2 . . . . .  p , ) ,  to the distribu- 
tion of group decisions, (PI, P2, • . . ,  P,) ,  is to link individual 
preference to the possible initial distributions of opinion in 
groups. If groups are composed randomly, it follows from the 
multinomial distribution that the probability, 7ri, that the group 
will begin deliberation with the ith possible distribution, (ri~, 
r~2 . . . . .  r in) ,  where( r ,  + ri2 + • .. + rin = r), is just 
(e l  7( i = p~li, p~i2. . .p~i,. (2) 
F i l r i2  • • • ?"in ] 
If these probabilities and the distribution of group decisions are 
expressed as row vectors, lr = (lrl, 7re . . . . .  r,~) and P = (PI, P2, 
. . . .  P.) ,  we may relate the distribution of starting points of 
group decision making, ~r, which Equation 2 shows to be a sim- 
pie function of the distribution of  individual preferences, p to 
group judgments, P,  with the following matrix-algebra 
equation: 
P = 7rD. (3) 
As this equation indicates, groups' final decisions depend on 
two things: (a) where group members begin deliberation, sum- 
marized by ~r, which depends entirely on individual judgments 
(see Equation 2 ) and (b) the processes whereby group members 
combine their preferences to define a group decision, formally 
summarized by the social decision scheme matrix, D. The effect 
of any variable or process that affects the magnitude of relative 
bias could, in principle, be understood by tracing its effect on 
where groups begin deliberation, its effect on the process 
whereby groups reach their decisions, or both. As we shall see 
shortly, it is useful to distinguish between the simple case in 
which access to biasing information does not affect the group 
decision-making process versus where it does. Equation 2 also 
suggests that if we know how biased individuals are and can 
make intelligent guesses about the operative social decision 
scheme, it should be possible to use the SDS model to compare 
the magnitude of individual and group bias under various con- 
ditions of interest (e.g., different ypes of bias, different-sized 
groups, different social decision schemes). That is precisely the 
strategy followed in this article. 
Before continuing with our application of the SDS model, we 
pause to characterize the possible nature of  the group processes 
that are summarized by D. 
Indiv iduals and Groups as In format ion  Processors 
In this section we explore the question, how does group judg- 
ment differ from individual judgment? We attempt to show that 
every aspect of individual information processing may be al- 
Table 2 
Alternative Social Decision Schemes 
Social decision schemes 
Predeliberation 
splits Simple majority Proportionality 
G NG G NG G NG 
Strong 
Equiprobability Truth wins a asymmetry ~ 
G NG G NG G NG 
1t 0 1.00 .00 1.00 .00 
l0  1 1.00 .00 .91 .09 
9 2 1.00 .00 .82 .18 
8 3 1.00 .00 .73 .27 
7 4 1.00 .00 .64 .36 
6 5 1.00 .00 .55 .45 
5 6 .00 1.00 .45 .55 
4 7 .00 1.00 .36 .64 
3 8 .00 1.00 .27 .73 
2 9 .00 1.00 .18 .82 
1 10 .00 1.00 .09 .91 
0 11 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 
1.00 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 .00 
.50 .50 .00 1.00 .99 .01 
.50 .50 .00 1.00 .23 .77 
.50 .50 .00 1.00 .14 .86 
.50 .50 .00 1.00 .10 .90 
.50 .50 .00 1.00 .08 .92 
.50 .50 .00 1.00 .05 .95 
.50 .50 .00 1.00 .04 .96 
.50 .50 .00 1.00 .03 .97 
.50 .50 .00 1.00 .02 .98 
.50 .50 .00 1.00 .01 .99 
.00 1.00 .00 1.00 .00 1.00 
Note. G = guilty; NG = not guilty. 
" Here. alternative NG is assumed to be "'true." 
used to generate this D 
b Clearly, the asymmetry favors the NG alternative. See Appendix B for information on the function 
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tered when groups are making judgments. We hope, thereby, to 
rectify a common misunderstanding about the nature of social 
decision schemes and to illustrate the difficulty of precisely 
specifying D a priori. We then introduce our present analytic 
approach: to explore the effect of several generic social decision 
schemes on relative bias. 
A common metaphor in cognitive psychology is the human 
judge as an information processor who is provided with infor- 
mation, processes it in various ways, and outputs a response. A 
crude schematic model of the individual as information proces- 
sor (adapted from Hinsz et al., in press) is sketched on the left- 
hand panel of Figure 1 (Intrapersonal Information Processing). 
The demands of the judgment task itself provide acontext for all 
stages: They define what is and is not task-relevant information, 
which intrapersonal cognitive activities can reasonably be seen 
as task related, and the objective of the judgment task (i.e., task- 
relevant responses). Between stimulus (information) and re- 
sponse, many intermeshed cognitive activities occur, character- 
ized here (crudely and nonexhaustively) by the processes of at- 
tention, encoding, storage, retrieval, and processing (e.g., 
counterargumentation; see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) of infor- 
mation. Biased individual information processing is demon- 
strated by comparing the final response with some idealized cri- 
terion (when documenting a sin of imprecision of judgment) or 
with the responses of other individuals given somewhat different 
initial information (when documenting sins of commission or 
omission). In either case however, we can specify how randomly 
composed groups of size r would begin the process of group 
judgment (i.e., w), knowing only the outcome ofintraindividual 
information processing (i.e., p).  The link from individual judg- 
ment, p, to the distribution of prediscussion group member 
judgments, ~r, entails only sampling processes, not psychologi- 
cal processes. 
When the judge is not an isolated individual but a group of r 
people, how is the information-processing task altered? 4 Some 
such changes are represented schematically in the right panel 
of Figure 1 (Interpersonal/Group Information Processing; see 
Hinsz et al., in press, and Levine & Resnick, 1993, for a more 
extensive analysis). First, the demands of the task are broad- 
ened. Illustrations of such possible new or altered emands are 
Intrapersonal Processing 
Information [ 




• -~ Retrieval 
Processing 
| __  
Response 
Interpersonal/Crroup Processing 
Group Attention ~ ~ I~ l  
Group Encoding ~" 0 1~-41 
S  ago 
g Group Retrieval -- ~' 
Group Processing 
Group Decision Rule 
D 
Figure 1. A schematic model of groups as information processors. 
presented in Appendix A. For example, in the group context, 
members are often concerned with the task of maintaining or 
improving interpersonal relationships a well as the task of mak- 
ing a collective judgment (Thibaut & Strickland, 1956). As 
Janis' (1982) classic work on groupthink indicates, such group 
task demands can interfere with thorough, accurate judgment 
in groups. Similarly, group members are likely to be concerned 
about the impression they create as they contribute (or fail to 
contribute) to the collective task. In this vein, group discussion 
or deliberation may vary its style (Hastie, Penrod, & Penning- 
ton, 1983), with varying emphasis on thorough exchange and 
analysis of information versus consistently maintaining and de- 
fending one's initial preferences. And, unlike the individual 
judge, group members must work towards ome level of consen- 
sus before producing a (collective) response (Miller, 1989; Stas- 
ser, Kerr, et al., 1989). 
Likewise, shifting the judgment ask from the individual to 
the group context potentially may modify every aspect of intra- 
individual information processing (signified by the regions la- 
beled Group Attention, Group Encoding, etc., on the group side 
of the information-processing boxin Figure 1 ). Some of these 
modifications stem from certain features of the group perfor- 
mance context; others from the differences between individuals 
and groups in information processing capacity. Again, Appen- 
dix A presents a (nonexhaustive) sampling of some of these po- 
tential modifications. For example, attentional processes may 
be altered because of the distraction created by the group 
context (Baron, 1986), because there is lowered motivation to 
attend due to the nonidentifiability of individual contributions 
to the collective product (Harkins & Szymanski, 1987; Latan6, 
Williams, & Harkins, 1979) or to the possibility that other 
group members might pick up information that one has missed 
(Kerr, 1983; Harkins & Petty, 1982), or because the mere pres- 
ence of other people facilitates imple (and inhibits complex) 
attentional performance (Zajonc, 1965 ). The reactions of other 
group members may also affect how one encodes available in- 
formation; for example, by priming a schema (Higgins, Rholes, 
& Jones, 1977) or by providing a socially defined consensus on 
the meaning of new information (Festinger, 1954). The com- 
ments of fellow group members may serve as a cue to assist one's 
recall of task-relevant information. Obviously, the potential ca- 
pacity for storage and retrieval of information is greater in the 
group context (cf. Hartwick, Sheppard, & Davis, 1982), partic- 
ularly when responsibility for such storage and retrieval is dis- 
tributed through some type of division of labor (Wegner, 1986). 
The process of articulating and defending one's position during 
group discussion may also give group members better access to 
and awareness of their cognitive processing strategies (much as 
Ericsson and Simon, 1993, have suggested that individual "talk 
aloud" or "think aloud" protocols provide more veridical data 
on cognitive processing than retrospective s lf reports). On the 
other hand, the group context can also impede the retrieval of 
relevant information. For example, Stasser and his colleagues 
(Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987; Stasser, Taylor, et al., 1989; Stasser 
& Stewart, 1992 ) have shown that information that is 
4 In this discussion, we have drawn liberally from Hinsz et al., (in 
press). See that article for a focused iscussion of related issues. 
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between group members i (relative to shared information) un- 
likely to be elicited uring group discussion. The group context 
may also alter the nature of the ultimate processing of available 
information. Clearly, there are facilitative possibilities, includ- 
ing (a) independent parallel processing of information (cf. 
Lorge & Solomon, 1955; Taylor, 1954); (b) the elusive "assem- 
bly bonus effect" (Tindale, 1992), the combination ofdifferent 
pieces of information that are separately inadequate oproduce 
an accurate judgment but which together make a new, emergent 
solution possible; (c) fellow members catching and correcting 
one's errors (Shaw, 1932); (d) random error reduction simply 
through increasing the number of unbiased judgments being 
integrated (Zajonc, 1962 ); (e) for certain tasks, recognition by 
group members that an argument or position advocated by an- 
other group member isself-evidently correct (Laughlin & Ellis, 
1986 ); or (f) the voicing of alternative positions during group 
deliberation might produce xpectancy disconfirmation, which 
has been shown to undermine judgmental confidence and pro- 
mote more systematic processing of information (e.g., Mahes- 
waran & Chaiken, 1991 ). Conversely, some aspects of the group 
context might impair or further bias processing. For example, 
recent work on brainstorming (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987 )suggests 
that when other group members are talking, production of one's 
own ideas is blocked. Or, if the initial, emerging consensus i
for an inaccurate judgment, social-comparison processes could 
derail effective processing. 
Finally, even in the rather unlikely event hat the r members 
of the group were to independently process available informa- 
tion in parallel, they would still typically have to resolve differ- 
ences in judgment to produce a consensual group response. 
This implicates the full range of social influence processes, from 
simple conformity to genuine persuasion to accepting a com- 
promise judgment advocated by no group member to acceding 
to the judgment legitimized by an implicit or explicit decision 
rule (e.g., majority rules). 
The social decision scheme matrix, D, does not (as some have 
suggested; Myers & Lamm, 1976) simply embody this final, 
effective social decision rule (i.e., final consensus requirement). 
Rather, D summarizes the totality of the modifications toinfor- 
mation processing resulting from moving from the individual 
as judge to the group as judge (i.e., to all the processes symbol- 
ized on the right panel of Figure 1 ). Given the current state of 
knowledge, we cannot even anticipate all possible such modifi- 
cations, much less specify a priori which such ones may arise 
and be important for any particular judgmental task. (We will 
return to a discussion of some such modifications later, though.) 
What we can do, though, is to identify certain generic social 
decision schemes that are of theoretical interest, have been 
shown to accurately summarize the group decision-making 
process for a sizeable range of interesting tasks, or both. We can 
then explore theoretically the implications of these Ds for the 
contrast of bias between individual and group judges. 
To simplify our subsequent presentation, we restrict our at- 
tention to the simplest possible judgment task: one with only 
two choice alternatives (i.e., n = 2). Because we frequently use 
jury decision making to illustrate our ideas, we label those two 
alternatives G and NG (for guilty and not guilty). Although 
certain interesting processes can arise in cases where the re- 
sponse scale is multichotomous or continuous (Davis, 1996; 
Kerr, 1992 ), nearly all of the judgmental biases of interest here 
can be reduced to the simple dichotomous case by collapsing 
response categories. We occasionally note when our conclusions 
need to be qualified by this simplifying assumption. 
Alternative Generic Social Decision Schemes 
Proportionality D
In this article we focus on four generic social decision 
schemes. The first, the Proportionality D, is primarily of theo- 
retical interest. This decision scheme assumes that the proba- 
bility of a particular faction prevailing in the group is equal to 
the relative frequency of that faction (i.e., d o = ro/r). The pro- 
portionality decision scheme for an 11-person group choosing 
between two decision alternatives (i.e., n = 2, r = 11 ) is included 
in Table 2. To our knowledge, no research as ever found that 
a strict proportionality decision scheme actually provided an 
accurate summary of group decision making at any task 
(although one can imagine hypothetical social processes that 
would result in such a decision schemeP). Nevertheless, two 
things make this decision scheme interesting and worth consid- 
ering here: (a) its net effect is to reproduce xactly at the group 
level those judgments observed at the individual level (i.e., P 
= p under the proportionality scheme); and (b) it serves as a 
theoretical boundary between two other classes of decision 
schemes that do have demonstrated mpirical utility. 
Majority D 
The class of decision scheme for which there is the widest 
empirical support (see Stasser, Kerr, et al., 1989) is the major- 
ity-wins social decision scheme, of which the simple majority- 
wins D is a prototype; the (n = 2, r = 11 ) case is illustrated in 
Table 2. It has been shown that such a primary decision scheme 
(or a close relative like a two-thirds majority wins; cf. Davis et 
al., 1974) accurately summarizes the decision-making process 
of groups at many different asks, including attitudinal judg- 
ments ( Kerr et al., 1976), duplex bets (Davis et al., 1974), and 
jury decisions (see Davis, 1980, for a review). Laughlin (e.g., 
Laughlin & Ellis, 1986) has suggested that such a decision 
scheme generally applies to group decision making at judg- 
mental tasks, which possess no clear criterion for the correct- 
ness of decision alternatives. Many aesthetic, political, ethical, 
and attitudinal judgments are, in this sense, judgmental tasks. 
The unifying feature of the generic majority social decision 
schemes i that they all exhibit "strength in numbers." That is, 
relatively large factions carry disproportionate influence; for- 
mally, i fMC = a majority criterion (e.g., MC = 0.5 for a simple 
majority-rules scheme; MC = 0.66 for a two-thirds majority- 
rules scheme), then d o > (ro/r) for ro/r> MC. This reflects 
the underlying logic of Laughlin's hypothesis: when there is no 
s For example, the proportionality scheme would summarize a group 
decision-making process in which groups imply endorsed the initial 
preference ofa single, randomly selected member. Slightly less fanciful 
would be a process wherein each group member participated equally 
and the group was equally likely to endorse the position advocated in
every argument expressed. 
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objective basis for evaluating the "correctness" or "accuracy" 
of a judgment (i.e., no widely shared and easily applied evalua- 
tive conceptual system), we must often rely on social consensus 
to define a valid response (cf. Festinger, 1954). 
Equiprobability D 
If majority-wins decision schemes exhibit disproportionate 
strength in numbers and if in a proportionality decision scheme 
faction strength is exactly equal to its proportional size, then we 
may also envision decision schemes in which there is little or no 
strength in numbers (e.g., where d,~ < ri/r for relatively large 
r0). One such decision scheme is an equiprobability scheme, in 
which every alternative with at least one advocate is equally 
likely to become the group's final choice (see Table 2 for an 
example). Johnson and Davis (1972) and Davis, Hornik, and 
Hornseth (1970) found evidence that such a decision scheme 
accurately accounted for group probability matching judg- 
ments. Davis (1982) has speculated that this decision scheme 
might characterize group decision making under high task un- 
certainty. Kerr (1983) and Laughlin and Ellis (1986) speculate 
that such a decision process might arise when group members 
have very little commitment to or investment in their prefer- 
ences, when maintaining roup harmony is vital, or both. In 
support of the latter conjectures, Kerr (1992) found that as the 
importance of the issue being discussed by group members de- 
clined, so did factions' apparent strength in numbers. 
Asymmetric D 
Laughlin ( 1980; Laughlin & Ellis, 1986) has also suggested 
that for many tasks there is a widely shared consensus on the 
criteria for the evaluating group decisions. Simple mathematics 
problems nicely illustrate such intellective tasks; basic mathe- 
matical rules provide an objective basis for arguing that one so- 
lution is better than another. When certain conditions are met, 
Laughlin and Ellis (1986) suggest that particular alternatives 
are demonstrably correct. These conditions are (a) a conceptual 
evaluative system is shared among group members; (b) there 
is sufficient information available to the group to discover the 
"correct" response; (c) group members are able to recognize 
such a correct solution when it is presented in the group; and 
(d) any group member or members who favor the "correct" 
response have the ability, motivation, and time to demonstrate 
its correctness. The first of these criteria underscores an impor- 
tant point to which we will return. It is certainly possible to 
judge correctness within an abstract, formal logic with a few 
axioms, such as judging that a particular proof of a mathemati- 
cal theorem is correct. However, when it becomes a matter of 
asserting and defending the correctness of one's judgment o 
others, "correctness" is largely a social construction. There 
must be some kind of reasonably clear and widely shared social 
consensus about what is and is not "correct" (and why) in order 
for one to convince others that one's preferred judgment is in- 
deed the "correct" one. Moreover, the shared conceptual evalu- 
ative system underlying such judgments need not correspond to 
any particular normative (i.e., logically or empirically correct) 
system. For example, among Galileo's inquisitors, the assump- 
tion that everything in the universe revolved around the earth 
was clearly "correct," despite the clear empirical evidence he 
could provide that Jupiter had moons that revolved around it. 
To avoid confusion between the latter notion of normative cor- 
rectness and the former, socially defined notion, we will con- 
tinue to add quotes whenever we mean that an alternative is
demonstrably "correct" in Laughlin's ense. 
For highly demonstrable tasks, Laughlin has shown (e.g., 
Laughlin et al., 1976; Laughlin & Ellis, 1986) that all that is 
required for the group to choose the "correct" alternative is for 
there to be a single individual who advocates this alternative 
(a truth-wins social decision scheme; see Table 2). When the 
demonstrability conditions are not as fully met, advocates of 
the "correct" alternative may require some social support o 
prevail (a truth-supported wins decision scheme; e.g., Laughlin 
et al., 1975; Laughlin & Earley, 1982). 
The distinctive feature of the decision schemes that summa- 
rize group judgment at intellective or quasi-intellective tasks is 
their asymmetry: Factions favoring the "'correct" alternative are 
more likely to prevail than comparable (i.e., equally large) fac- 
tions favoring an "incorrect" alternative. In order to explore the 
effects of such asymmetries for the relative bias of groups versus 
individuals, we constructed a strongly asymmetric decision 
scheme. The 11-person group version of this D is presented in 
the far right panel of Table 2 (see Appendix B). As one can see 
in the table, this decision scheme strongly favors alternative NG, 
with alternative G prevailing only when the initial support for 
alternative G is very large. This D characterizes likely group 
decision-making processes when alternative NG is a highly 
(although not wholly, as in "truth wins") demonstrably "cor- 
rect" answer. 
Summary 
We have identified four generic social decision schemes: pro- 
portionality (in which a faction's trength is precisely equal to 
its relative size), majority-wins (in which large factions' 
strength is larger than their relative size; i.e., there is strength in 
numbers), equiprobability (in which large factions' strength is 
less than their relative size), and asymmetric decisions chemes 
in which an alternative isdemonstrably "correct" within some 
social context. 
The implications of these four generic social decision 
schemes for the contrast of individual versus group bias can be 
revealed via thought experiments (Davis & Kerr, 1986). Using 
the SDS model, we can not only compare the effects of different 
global processes of group judgment or decision making (by 
comparing and contrasting the generic Ds), but by varying 
other variables and model parameters (e.g., magnitude of indi- 
vidual bias; group size), we can also explore their effects on the 
central contrast of interest. Wherever enough information is 
available for an empirical study cited in Table 1 (e.g., the social 
decision scheme is estimated irectly or can be safely assumed 
to be similar to one of the generic Ds we consider), we will com- 
pare the results of that study to those obtained in our thought 
experiments. 
In carrying out our analysis, two general cases can be distin- 
guished. In the first and simpler case (Case 1 ), a single, unitary 
process of group judgment, summarized by a single D matrix, 
describes all groups. That is, all groups transform initial group 
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member preferences togroup judgments utilizing the same ba- 
sic group decision-making process. Under this case, exposure to 
potentially biasing information may alter individual prefer- 
ences (i.e., p),  but it does not alter the process by which groups 
forge a collective judgment out of those member preferences 
(i.e., D itself). In the second case (Case 2), exposure to poten- 
tially biasing information again may ( or may not) affect he pro- 
cess of individual judgment (and, hence, p),  but does affect he 
process of group judgment (i.e., D). We separately consider 
Case 1 and Case 2 below. 
Case 1." Unitary Group-Judgment Process 
We have now defined three qualitatively different types of bias 
and identified several (viz., four) different Ds (summary pro- 
cesses for group information processing or decision making) 
that are empirically or theoretically interesting. Below, using 
computer-assisted analyses, we examine the consequences for 
RB, the relative bias between individuals and groups, of each of 
the possible combinations of D and bias type (see Grofman, 
1978, for a similar, but more limited analysis). Our objective is 
to map RB across the full domain of possible levels of individual 
bias and to see how RB may depend upon a variety of factors 
(such as the type of bias, the idealized standard of unbiased 
judgment, he magnitude of individual bias, group size, and the 
process of group decision making) .6 
Sins o f  Imprecis ion ( So f  I) 
Proportionality D. As noted above, a proportionality social 
decision scheme simply reproduces the entire distribution of 
individual judgments in groups, such that P = p. Because 
groups reach precisely the same decisions as individuals under 
this decision scheme, there should never be any difference in the 
magnitude of bias (i.e., RB = 0, under all possible conditions, 
all possible group sizes, all possible ideal Is, etc.). However, this 
degenerate case is still useful as a theoretical baseline (Davis, 
1969) and as means of introducing our method of conducting 
and plotting the results of our thought experiments. 
Because we have restricted our attention to dichotomous 
judgments, the distribution of judgments by individual judges 
is fully expressed by Pc, the proportion of individuals favoring 
the first alternative (since PuG = 1.0 - Pc). Our base analyses 
assumed that group size, r, was 11 (an odd number was chosen 
to obviate a subscheme for the majority D). Then, for every 
possible individual behavior (i.e., for any Pc value between 0.0 
and 1.0), we calculated the expected istribution of group 
choices, Pc, under the assumption of a proportionality group 
decision-making process by using Equations 1-3 and the pro- 
portionality D in Table 2. Of course, for the proportionality de- 
cision scheme, because/5c always is equal to Pc, the plot of/~6 
as a function ofpG is the simple straight line depicted in Figure 
2 and RB would always equal 0 (since RB = B - b = I P - I I 
- IP - I I ) .  The same would also be true for any other group 
size. 
Simple-majority D. A rather different functional relation- 
ship resulted, though, when the simple-majority D in Table 2 
was used in a similar computer-assisted analysis (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Predicted group judgment,/5c, asa function of individual 
judgment, Pc, under proportionality and simple-majority social deci- 
sion schemes. 
group decision-making process that has strength in numbers, 
which gives large factions disproportional influence, is to make 
the more popular individual choice even more popular among 
groups. As Figure 2 shows (also see Davis, 1973; Davis & Kerr, 
1986; Kerr & Huang, 1986), if alternative G is preferred by a 
minority of individuals and if groups follow a simple-majority 
decision scheme, alternative G is favored by an even smaller 
proportion of groups. Likewise, i fG  is preferred by most indi- 
viduals, an even larger fraction of groups operating under a sim- 
ple-majority D will endorse alternative G. In short, the popular 
responses become more popular and the unpopular responses 
less popular under a majority-wins decision scheme. One im- 
plication of this process under most conditions i  the group po- 
larization of mean individual preferences (Myers & Lamm, 
1976; Kerr, Davis, Atkin, Holt, and Meek, 1975 ). 
This pattern, although perhaps not intuitively obvious, is re- 
flected in familiar experience. A vivid example is the way in 
which national difference of 6% in individual voters' preference 
for presidential candidates Bush and Clinton resulted in a 37% 
difference in popularity in the electoral college; of course, state 
electors are chosen using a majority-rules (or, more precisely, 
plurality-rules) decision rule (see Rosenwein & Campbell, 
1992). This pattern is easily understood as a direct consequence 
of a familiar sampling principle: sample statistics are more sta- 
ble in larger (e.g., group) than smaller (e.g., individual) sam- 
ples. For example, consider a biased coin that produces "heads" 
with probability .60 on individual flips. However, suppose that 
instead of considering individual flips we considered "groups" 
of 1,000 flips. Now, the probability of getting more heads than 
tails (i.e., a majority of heads) in such a "group" would be con- 
siderably higher than .60 (approximately 1.0, in fact). As sam- 
6 In this article we present the full results of these computer-assisted 
analyses. Elsewhere (Kerr et al., 1996) we have presented a physical 
metaphor that can assist one's intuition about he consequences of our 
theoretical ssumptions. 
BIAS IN INDIVIDUALS VERSUS GROUPS 699 
pie size decreases, the sampling error increases and "the pro- 
portion of samples getting more heads than tails" statistic de- 
clines until it reaches .60 when sample size equals one. 
The foregoing clearly suggests that the larger the group is, the 
stronger the polarizing effect of group decision making. And in- 
deed, when one compares the results of repeating our computer 
analysis with a smaller-sized group (r = 3), one confirms this 
suggestion (see Figure 2). This turns out to be a very general 
phenomenon: The effects of the social decision-making process 
summarized by a particular D matrix are generally more pro- 
nounced as the size of the group increases. The implication of 
this rule for our present discussion isthat the magnitude of(any 
nonzero) RB tends to increase as group size increases (all else 
being equal), but whether groups or individuals are more sus- 
ceptible to bias (i.e., the sign of RB) tends not to be affected by 
variations in group size. 
Clearly, because a majority-wins process can produce differ- 
ences between distributions of individual and group judgment, 
there is the potential for differences in the relative magnitude 
of bias exhibited by individuals and such groups (i.e., in RB) .  
However, these effects depend crucially upon the nature of the 
original individual bias, b, which depends in turn upon what 
constitutes unbiased judgment (since b = [p - II ). To illus- 
trate, we return to our prospect theory example, for which I = 
(P~.G, P~.Nc) = (.50, .50). To simplify, we restrict our attention 
to the G alternative. That is, rather than calculating and plotting 
RB = [ B - bl = I P - I I  - ]P - I I ,  we examine the related 
quantity RB'  = I/SG - .51 - I P~ - .51. (In the dichotomous- 
alternative case, it is easy to show that two quantities RB'  and 
RB are strictly proportional to one another (viz., RB'  = 
RB/V2) ;  thus, patterns in RB are fully captured by examining 
RB' . )  In Figure 3A we plot the resulting RB'  as a function of pc 
(here group size = 1 l, and/;G is as predicted by the simple- 
majority D). As the figure shows, if there is any bias among 
individuals (i.e., Pc 4: .5), under these particular conditions 
groups would always show a larger bias than individuals (i.e., 
RB > 0; unless Pc = 0.0 or 1.0, where floor and ceiling effects 
prevent groups from being any more biased than individuals). 
However, what if the model of unbiased judgment prescribed 
that alternative NG was the correct, unbiased choice, that is, I 
= (PI.6-, Pmvo) = (0.0, 1.0)? For example, in Kahneman and 
Tversky's (1972) well-known research demonstrating improper 
use of sample size information, we might force participants o
choose between Hospital G (with 45 births per day) and Hospi- 
tal NG (with 15 births per day) in response to the question 
posed by Kahneman and Tversky (viz., "Over the course of a 
year, which of these two hospitals will have more days on which 
more than 60% of the births were boys?"); because there is 
greater sampling error with a smaller sample, the normatively 
correct answer is Hospital NG. As Figure 3B shows, if most 
individuals get this question correct (Pc < .50) and 11-person 
groups operate under a simple-majority decision scheme, even 
more groups will make the correct judgment (i.e., RB'  > 0), 
but if most individuals are wrong (Pc > .50), an even larger 
fraction of groups will be mistaken (i.e., RB'  < 0). Given the 
symmetry in the simple-majority decision rule, precisely the 
opposite function would result had alternative G been the "cor- 
rect" response (see Figure 3C). 
If the idealized, nonbiased standard of judgment were not one 
of these standard possibilities (i.e., all for G, all for NG, or in- 
difference between G and NG), the picture can become more 
complicated. For example, we also plotted the RB'  versus Pa 
function when unbiased behavior requires individuals to favor 
alternative G 75% of the time, that is I = (.75, .25 ).7 As Figure 
3D shows, when individuals are relatively highly biased (Pc < 
.5), groups operating under the simple-majority decision 
scheme tend to exacerbate his bias, as in all the previous cases 
we have considered. However, if individual performance were 
less biased (i.e., P6 > .5), we see that the result of a majority 
rule is a complex function, with groups reducing bias in one 
region (.5 -< Pc -< .67 ) and increasing it in another (Pc > .67). 
The moral of these stories hould be clear: As far as sins of 
imprecision are concerned, a group decision-making process 
that gives disproportionate w ight o numerically arge factions 
( like the simple majority-rules D) does not have a single, simple 
effect on the relative magnitude ofgroup versus individual bias. 
Generally, good (i.e., unbiased) individual performance r sults 
in even better group performance, whereas poor (biased) indi- 
vidual performance t nds to be reflected in even poorer group 
performance. However, RB will also depend (systematically) 
upon how ideal-unbiased responding is defined, how biased in- 
dividuals are, and how large the group is. This conclusion is 
not simply a theoretical curiosity. Strength-in-numbers group 
decision-making processes seem to characterize a wide domain 
of judgmental tasks. Theoretically, this should occur any time 
the normatively unbiased-ideal (or any other) response is not 
demonstrably correct (Laughlin & Ellis, 1986); this is a situa- 
tion that seems likely to characterize many of the complex in- 
formation processing tasks for which individual judgmental bi- 
ases have been demonstrated. And, as noted above, various ma- 
jority-wins Ds have been empirically validated more often and 
for more tasks than any other general type of social decision 
scheme. 
Equiprobabi l i ty.  The net effect of an equiprobability social 
decision process (in which there is no strength in (non- 
unanimous) numbers) isprecisely opposite to that produced by 
the majority process we have just considered (in which there is 
disproportionate s rength in numbers; Davis, 1973 ). As we have 
seen, the latter tends to enhance among roups individual pref- 
erence differences among individuals; the former tends to 
smoothe out among groups any individual preference differ- 
ences among roups. This is evident in the plots of/;c versus Pc 
7 One has to be a bit creative (and perhaps dogmatic about what 
would constitute an unbiased judgment) oillustrate this case for a di- 
chotomous judgment. For example, in a probability matching task 
(Zajonc, Wolosin, Wolosin, & Sherman, 1968) in which Light G is lit 
75% of the time and Light NG is lit 25% of the time, one (arguable) 
definition of unbiased behavior would prescribe that he judge choose 
G 75% of the time and NG 25% of the time. However, with a multial- 
ternative r sponse scale, one can easily identify judgmental tasks where 
the ideal-unbiased judgment takes on some particular intermediate 
value (e.g., a posterior-odds judgment prescribed by Bayes's theorem). 
The important point is that he same complex variation in RB modeled 
here for the theoretically precise and tractable dichotomous case would 
also obtain in the multialternative case under a majority-rules D and 
reasonable distributional ssumptions ( ee Footnote 11; Kerr et al., 
1975). 
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Figure 3. Plots of RB' versus Pc, under a simple-majority D when I = (Pl;c,, PI.NC;) is (a) (.50, .50), (b) (0, 
1.0), (c) ( 1.0, 0), and (d) (.75, .25 ). RB' = relative bias; Pc = assumed proportion of individuals preferring 
G; D = the social decision scheme matrix; I = ideal criterion distribution; Pl,c, = ideal proportion of indi- 
vidual favoring G; Pl,uc" = ideal proportion of individuals favoring NG. 
for 11 - and 3-person groups operating under a strict equiproba- 
bility D (see Figure 4A). Relative to the proportionality base- 
line, these curves are qualitatively mirror images of the corre- 
sponding curves for majority rules (i.e., they reverse the quali- 
tative effect of grouping; compare Figure 4A with Figure 2). 
No matter what individuals tend to prefer, the equiprobability 
decision process tends to pull groups towards a position of uni- 
form preference across alternatives; here, towards ( .5, .5 ). Once 
again, the larger the groups, the stronger this tendency. 
Given the essential symmetry of the effects of majority and 
equiprobability decision schemes (around the impactless pro- 
portionality baseline), it should not be surprising that the re- 
sults of the computer analyses deriving RB' under the equipro- 
bability decision scheme produce precisely the opposite pat- 
terns to those we just observed for majority rules. So, the 
general tendency for majority rules to enhance bias in groups 
is reflected by a corresponding tendency for equiprobability o 
suppress bias in groups; exceptions to the former rule are 
(inverted) exceptions to the latter (compare Figure 3A with 4B 
and 3D with 4C). 
It is not the widespread applicability of the equiprobability 
process that makes these results interesting. Indeed, as noted 
previously, this particular group decision-making process has 
only been empirically confirmed for a few rather unusual judg- 
ment tasks. What these analyses do demonstrate, though, is that 
even if many other important features of the judgment setting 
were held constant (such as judgment task, ideal-unbiased cri- 
terion, group size), one can reach exactly the opposite conclu- 
sions about he relative degree of bias of groups and individuals 
under different group decision-making processes. So, for exam- 
ple, if group members tenaciously defend their initial prefer- 
ences and finally wear down opposing minority views (one type 
of social process consistent with majority wins), the prospect 
theory sin of imprecision we have used as a running example 
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would generally be stronger among groups than individuals 
(Figure 3A). But if group members were (for whatever reason) 
uncommonly eager to accommodate opposing viewpoints, even 
to the point of entirely disregarding which viewpoints had 
many and which had few advocates (consistent with the equi- 
probability scheme), then groups should show a weaker bias 
than individuals (Figure 4B). The clear and crucial point is that 
no conclusion about the relative bias of individuals and groups 
can be reached without careful specification of the operative 
group decision-making process. 
Strongly asymmetric D. Suppose in our running prospect- 
theory example that alternative G is the certain-loss alternative 
and alternative NG is the uncertain-loss alternative (with equal 
expected value). An expected-utility model would suggest that 
the ideal, unbiased, and correct choice would be indifference be- 
tween these two alternatives. Further suppose that the uncertain 
NG alternative was highly (although not completely) "demon- 
strably correct" in the sense that Laughlin (e.g., Laughlin & Ellis, 
1986) has used the term. This means that it would take very few 
risk-seeking group members to insure that the group as a whole 
would opt for the risk-seeking response (i.e., NG); this would be 
the effect of the group decision-making process embodied in the 
strongly asymmetric D matrix presented inTable 2. 
It is very important to stress again that Laughlin's (e.g., 
Laughlin & Ellis, 1986) shared conceptual system for evalua- 
tion of alternatives that is the basis for the latter type of "cor- 
rectness" can be but need not be the same as the normative 
model of judgment that underlies the psychologist's or experi- 
menter's identification of the ideal-unbiased-correct choice 
(expected-utility theory, in the present case). These can be two 
wholly separate conceptual systems. The important features of 
the conceptual system of concern to Laughlin, which we might 
term the functional model of judgment, isthat it is widely shared 
and accepted in the population of judges, and that it is appealed 
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to by and will be persuasive to members of that population. 8 
This may or may not be the same conceptual system shared, 
accepted, and revered by logicians, statisticians, game theorists, 
etc. (i.e., the normative model). To illustrate: 
1. Although it would clearly be incorrect in the normative 
model that is English common law for a juror or a judge to treat 
a defendant's religion as evidence of guilt, such a bias might 
have been demonstrably "correct" in a courtroom in Nazi 
Germany. 
2. It is hard to think of a logical reason for characterizing one of 
the following football options as normatively correct: Should we 
kick for the extra point and settle for a tie (choice G) or go for 
the risky two-point conversion to try and win the game (choice 
NG)? But, Laughlin and Earley (1982) provide evidence that 
within a widely shared, conceptual belief system (in which the 
essential--only?--point of competitive sports is to win), the 
go-for-the-win alternative is "demonstrably correct." 
3. Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky (1993) recently argued that 
"the axioms of rational choice act as compelling arguments, or
reasons, for making aparticular decision when their applicabil- 
ity has been detected, not as universal laws that constrain peo- 
ple's choices" (p. 34; emphasis added). This suggests that in 
those studies where groups fail to show closer adherence tothe 
rational-choice normative model (e.g., McGuire et al., 1987; 
Mowen & Gentry, 1980), these axioms either fail to be voiced, 
do not appear applicable, or do not appear compelling (i.e., are 
not the axioms of people's functional model). 
Our first computer-assisted analysis using the strongly asym- 
metric decision scheme revealed that this D's net effect is quali- 
tatively much like a majority-rules decision scheme, but with a 
quantitative exception. If you feel comfortable with the graphical 
results of the analyses, examine Figure 5A (and compare with 
Figure 2) and note that the inflection point of the function relat- 
ing group to individual behavior (i.e., the function of/3a as a 
function of p~) is displaced to the right (see Figure 5A), toward 
the pole that is incorrect under the functional model. If you pre- 
fer to think in metaphorical terms, the strong asymmetry basi- 
cally acts like a strong pull toward the favored (here, NG) option, 
a pull that cannot be resisted in the group unless nearly all group 
members initially prefer the "incorrect" alternative (in the pres- 
ent instance, unless PG begins to approach 1.0; see Kerr et al., 
1996, for a further development of this metaphor). 
The net results on RB' of introducing such an asymmetry 
likewise produces a similar distortion of the corresponding ma- 
jority-wins function (e.g., compare Figure 5B with Figure 3D). 
The most interesting patterns emerge for the cases where the 
normative and functional conceptual systems are mutually re- 
inforcing ( or identical) versus mutually opposed to one another. 
Illustrating the former case, suppose the ideal-unbiased re- 
sponse is to choose the NG alternative, that is, I = (Pl,G, Pl.~a) = 
(0.0, 1.0). The extremely strong pull toward the NG alternative 
exerted by the strongly asymmetric D insures that groups are 
practically always closer to the ideal than individuals (i.e., RB' 
< 0; see Figure 5C); the rare exception occurs when practically 
no individuals favor the demonstrably correct alternative (see 
the tiny region where RB > 0 when Pc ~-- 1.0, Figure 5C). This 
strongly suggests that when the judges ubscribe to the same (or 
a functionally identical) ogic as the experimenter, that is, when 
the participants' and the experimenter's conceptual systems co- 
incide, groups should usually be much less biased (relative to 
the experimenter's criterion) than individuals. 
On the other hand, a functional model's trong pull would 
insure that groups would practically always be farther from the 
ideal if it were the normatively defined incorrect response that 
was, under that functional model, demonstrably correct, that is, 
i f /=  (Pl.a, Pl,~v6) = ( 1.0, 0.0). (See Figure 5D.) Again, the only 
time the group could manage to overcome this pull would be 
when there is practically no one who favors the "demonstrably 
correct" alternative. When the judges' personal logic is func- 
tionally opposite to the experimenter's, groups should usually 
be much more biased (relative to the experimenter's criterion) 
than individuals. 
One study cited in Table 1 provides a nice empirical i lustra- 
tion of the latter possibility. Tindale, Sheffey, and Filkins (1990) 
identified the number of persons in each of their 4-person 
groups who did not and did exhibit a conjunction error in an 
individual pretest and then determined whether the group itself 
committed such an error. In essence, this permitted Tindale et 
al. to estimate the operative D matrix to link individual perfor- 
mance, p = (Pc . . . . .  t ,  Perror), to group performance, P = ( P . . . . . .  t ,  
Perror). This D matrix estimate is reproduced in Table 3. It is 
clear that there is a strong asymmetry in the matrix, which in- 
dicates that the normatively incorrect alternative (committing 
a conjunction error) exercises a strong functional pull in the 
groups. As we have just shown, when a functional model oper- 
ates in opposition to the normative model, group discussion 
should typically exacerbate individual bias. And this was pre- 
cisely the result Tindale t al. obtained. 
Summary. When bias is defined as a sin of imprecision, RB 
has been shown to depend on a number of factors: what behav- 
ior is identified as ideal, on the degree of bias among individuals, 
(quantitatively) on the size of the group, and on the process 
whereby group judgments are reached. Examining the four ge- 
neric social decision schemes, few generalizations about relative 
bias have been shown that hold across all (or even most) levels 
of the remaining factors. In fact, about he only such general- 
izations to emerge from our analyses arose when there was a 
strong asymmetry in the group decision process. When the 
asymmetry favors the choice prescribed by the normative 
model (i.e., the normative and functional models coincide), 
bias is nearly always lower among roups than individuals. How- 
ever, when the asymmetry favors the other, normatively pro- 
scribed choice, bias is nearly always higher among roups than 
individuals. It has also been shown that (a) all other things being 
equal, processes that exhibit more-than-proportionate strength 
in numbers (e.g., majority wins) and those exhibiting less-than- 
proportionate strength in numbers (e.g., equiprobability) tend 
to lead to precisely opposite conclusions about relative bias; and 
(b) the direction of the difference in bias between individuals 
and groups is generally unaffected by group size, but this differ- 
ence tends to get larger as group size increases. 
8 Actually, there need not be just a single, unitary functional model. 
It is quite possible that there could be more than one such functional 
model. Their combined effects would be summarized by a D that would 
most likely be asymmetric. It is the nonexistence of any such functional 
model or models that is indicative of purely judgmental tasks, typically 
summarized by a symmetric D with high strength in numbers. 
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decision scheme matrix. 
Sins of  Commission ( Sof  C) 
As our review of the literature suggested, empirical compari- 
sons of individuals and groups for judgmental sins of im- 
precision are not commonplace. This probably reflects the fact 
that unambiguously demonstrating such a bias is very difficult. 
To do so requires (a) a normative model sufficient o make a 
point prediction (e.g., Meehl, 1990); (b) an experimental par- 
adigm that effectively controls all other sources of systematic 
judgmental error; and (c) a response scale that meets what may 
be severe psychometric requirements (e.g., interval or even-ra- 
tio level of measurement). Empirical demonstrations of sins of 
commission (and their converse, sins of omission) are far easier, 
and hence, more commonplace. The normative model need 
only make an ordinal prediction, other sources of systematic 
error can (with care) be equated in the high and low bias condi- 
tions, and valid conclusions may still be drawn without crawling 
out on shaky psychometric limbs. For these reasons, the explo- 
ration of the effect of individual bias, group size, etc., on RB in 
the SofC (and SofO) cases is more relevant to understanding 
existing (and potential) contrasts of individual and group judg- 
ment than the preceding analysis of the SofI case. However, the 
SofI analyses do provide a foundation for understanding these 
more typically studied judgmental biases. 
Proportionality D. Once again, the proportionality decision 
scheme is most useful as a baseline (against which to compare 
the other Ds) and as a way of introducing our method of pre- 
sentation for the computer-assisted analyses. In the judgmental 
sin of commission, judges use proscribed information. Because 
this type of bias involves comparing two groups of judges 
(which differ with respect to the availability or level of biasing 
information), there are now two "degrees of freedom" in the 
domain of possible individual bias effects: the popularity of the 
G alternative in the high-bias condition (Pt~,6) and the corre- 
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Table 3 
Est imated D Mat r ix  From Tindale, Sheffe); and Fi lk ins 
(1990; as Cited in Tindale, 1993) 
Prediscussion splits 




Correct Error N a Correct Error 
4 0 16 .63 .37 
3 1 65 .42 .58 
2 2 166 .31 .69 
1 3 189 .27 .73 
() 4 131 .10 .90 
Note. ~ Number of instances in which groups began discussion with 
this prediscussion split. 
sponding value within the low-bias condition (PL,~). Without 
any loss of generality (and in conformity to our labels), we as- 
sume that bias at the individual evel means not just that pn,G 4: 
PL.(I, but more specifically, that Pn,G > PL,~- For example, sup- 
pose we are interested in whether exposure to incriminating 
pretrial publicity biases jurors (Carroll et al., 1986). The nor- 
mative model of unbiased-ideal judgment would assert hat af- 
ter usual legal precautions have been taken (e.g., careful juror 
selection, judicial instructions to disregard information ob- 
tained outside of the courtroom), there should be no difference 
in conviction rate between those exposed to incriminating pub- 
l icity--high- (potential) bias condit ion--and those exposed to 
no or nonincriminating publicity--low-bias condition, that is, 
Pn,s. = pL,~;--whereas n elevated conviction rate in the former 
condition (i.e., Pm~; > PL,G) would indicate that such informa- 
tion biased juror judgment. Again, we want to explore what 
happens to relative bias, RB, across the full domain of possible 
individual degrees of bias: in the SofC case, for all (PH,G', PL,S) 
such that Pu,c; > PL/;. 
In Figure 6 we plot the individual bias surface, b = PH,S -- 
PC,<> (>0 since, by assumption pt+,~; > PL,~;). This surface is the 
baseline from which comparisons of bias in groups, B, is calcu- 
lated (since RB = B - b).  For any particular, possible behavior 
in the high- and low-bias individual conditions, that is, for any 
particular choice of (PH,G, PL,G), and any particular group de- 
cision-making process (assumed here in Case 1 to be a constant 
D), it is possible to predict, using the SDS model, what the cor- 
responding behaviors would be in high- and low-bias groups, 
that is, (Pn,G, PL,6) = OrHD, 7rLD), where lrH and ~rL are cal- 
culated from (PH,a, PL,a) using Equation 2. Thus, under the 
assumptions of our model, we can predict how biased groups 
should be for any particular pattern of individual bias. 
The results of such calculations for the proportionality D are 
simple. Because this decision scheme simply reproduces pre- 
cisely among groups what happens among individuals, B = 
[ Pn,o - PL,ol = [ P , ,a  - Pt ,o [ = b and RB = 0; groups and 
individuals would necessarily be equally biased. 
Simple-major i ty  D. The earlier analysis of SofI suggested 
that a simple-majority decision process often exacerbated bias 
in groups, but that for certain ideal-criterion values, the oppo- 
site could also occur. A qualitatively similar conclusion emerges 
from our analyses of the SofC case. The RB'  surface (with r = 
11 ) is plotted in Figure 7A. 9 Of  major interest, of course, is the 
departure of  RB '  values from 0; here, from the horizontal plane 
at RB'  = 0 (see Figure 7B), groups are more biased than indi- 
viduals where the surface is above this plane, and are less biased 
where the surface dips below this plane. This is a bit hard to see 
in the three-dimensional (3-D) plot, so in Figures 7C and 7D, 
we have plotted the intersection of the surface with the no-indi- 
vidual-group-difference plane (i.e., we plot the RB'  = 0 contour 
function). In Figure 7C the contour function is displayed with 
the same orientation as the previous plots. Figure 7D is a two- 
dimensional (2-D) version of Figure 7C ( imagine grasping the 
plane in Figure 7C by the edges and tilting it up; or imagine 
looking down on Figure 7C from above). This intersecting 
curve divides up the domain of possible individual behavior 
into regions where groups are more biased (RB '  > 0 and B > b) 
and groups are less biased (RB '  < 0, b > B) than individuals. As 
Figures 7C or 7D show, for the largest part of the domain of 
possible individual behaviors, the polarizing majority-rules 
process results in greater bias in groups.I° The exceptions arise 
when all individuals, in both the high- and low-bias conditions, 
get too close to either pole. The polarizing effect of the majority- 
wins scheme may be likened to strong, symmetric pulls at both 
ends of the response scale (cf. Kerr, MacCoun, & Kramer, 
1996). When individual preferences get somewhat extreme 
(i.e., P6 begins to approach either 0 or 1 ), group preferences get 
extremely extreme (i.e., Pc; gets very close to 0 or I ; see Figure 
2). Although hardly as catastrophic, this situation is a bit like 
wandering too close to a black hole: You get pulled in quickly 
and flattened at the event horizon (e.g., Hawking, 1988). If the 
high- and low-bias conditions, separated by a tangible distance, 
b, both get too near either pole, both conditions likewise get 
pulled (polarized) and their tangible b gets flattened to a less 
tangible B. ~ 
9 An identical analysis was run assuming a 3-person group. The re- 
sulting surface was precisely the same shape, but simply compressed on 
the vertical axis; that is, the magnitude of individual group differences 
were smaller, but qualitatively the same as in the analysis for 11 -person 
groups. 
~0 The more balanced the case being considered by the jury (i.e., the 
closer the overall conviction rate is to .5 ), the greater the exaggeration 
of bias in groups relative to individuals ( MacCoun, 1990). In this sense, 
at least, Kalven and ZeiseFs (1966) speculation that extralegal bias is 
"'liberated" ingroups considering very close cases is nicely confirmed. 
~ The simple, dichotomous-choice situation we have been consider- 
ing has a hidden but crucial characteristic: The extremity of individual 
preference ( .g., proportion convicting) isnegatively correlated with the 
skewness of the distribution. The net effect of applying amajority rule 
is to increase (among roups) the popularity of the modal position and 
to "pull in the tails" of the distribution (see Davis, 1973). If the distri- 
bution of individual preference is skewed, then this tends to move the 
mean closer to the mode of the distribution. It is very common, partic- 
ularly for bipolar response dimensions, for individual opinion to "tail 
off" ( i.e., be skewed ) in the direction opposite to the generally preferred 
position. It follows that a majority-rules scheme predicts group polar- 
ization in such cases (Kerr et al., 1975 ), producing the patterns that we 
have shown in the text. However, under other possible (but less 
common) distributional ssumptions, we would expect neither group 
polarization or an exaggeration fbias in groups. For example, if the 
high- and low-bias distributions of individual opinion were both sym- 
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Figure 6. Plot of individual degree of bias, b, for a sin of commission as a function of the probability of 
individuals favoring the guilty (G) alternative in the high-bias and low-bias conditions (i.e., Pn.G and PL,~;). 
Pn,c = proportion of individuals favoring G in the high-bias condition: Pc,c; = proportion of individuals 
favoring G in the low-bias condition. 
One thing this analysis teaches us is that whether groups are 
more or less biased than individuals does not only depend upon 
how biased individuals are (i.e., on the magnitude of b), but also 
upon the underlying base rate of  behavior. For example, suppose 
that individual jurors exhibited a bias of 10% due to some extra- 
legal factor (e.g., jurors exposed to prejudicial pretrial publicity 
show a conviction rate 10% higher than those not so exposed). 
The current analysis hows that under the majority-wins decision 
scheme, this effect would be larger in juries if the overall trial 
evidence were fairly balanced (e.g., the condition means were 
45% and 55%), but the same 10% effect among jurors would be 
attenuated within juries if the trial evidence were lopsided (e.g., 
the condition means were 5% vs. 15%). Thus, even if different 
investigators were examining precisely the same bias phenome- 
non using generally similar research paradigms, one could get 
completely opposite findings for the degree of relative bias with 
sufficiently different overall response base rates. 
metric, then application of a simple-majority rule will reduce variabil- 
ity in each but will not produce any shift in the means. Similarly, even 
if both the high- and low-bias distributions were skewed, if they differed 
only in central tendency (viz., if they were identically skewed), then a 
majority-rules scheme would produce identical shifts and no net differ- 
ence in the biasing effect for individuals and groups. And if extremity 
and skew were positively related (a possible but rather unusual pattern ),
a majority-wins process would produce depolarization and would gen- 
erally attenuate bias in groups. So for more complex, multialternative 
response scales than we focus on in our current analyses, RB will depend 
on other features (e.g., skewness) besides th  mean of the distribution 
of individual behavior. 
One might attribute the "compression" of sins of  commis- 
sion that occur near the poles of the judgment dimension as a 
type of floor or ceiling effect: The polarizing effect of  the major- 
ity-wins process should compress effects that begin near the 
poles of a bounded response scale. But it would be a mistake 
to dismiss this finding as simply a rare and easily recognized 
exception to the general rule. This is most strikingly illustrated 
by the clearest empirical demonstration that juries can attenu- 
ate juror bias, Kaplan and Miller (1978). Kaplan and Miller 
( 1978, Study 3 ) examined the biasing effect of the noneviden- 
tiary behavioral style of various people involved in presenting 
the case to jurors. In the part of the design of most direct interest 
to us, Kaplan and Miller contrasted a condition in which the 
defense attorney in a reenactment of an attempted manslaugh- 
ter trial acted in a delaying, obnoxious manner versus a second 
condition in which it was the prosecutor who acted obnox- 
iously. The legally relevant and material evidence presented to 
the mock jurors was identical in both conditions. The norma- 
tive model of judgment would prescribe that the jurors ignore 
the legally irrelevant factor f advocate's obnoxiousness when 
making the central judgment of guilt or innocence. However, 
Kaplan and Miller confirmed a judgmental sin of commission 
among mock jurors: Prior to jury deliberation the defendant 
was judged to be guiltier when his attorney acted obnoxiously 
than when the prosecutor acted obnoxiously. Kaplan and Miller 
also manipulated the overall strength of evidence against the 
defendant and, as one would expect, jurors were more likely to 
convict when the evidence against he defendant was stronger. 
Jurors then deliberated the case for 10 minutes in 12-person 
juries and then provided postdeliberation guilt judgments 
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Figure 7. Plots of (a) RB' as a function of (PH.o, PC,O) and (b) the RB' = 0 contour function under a 
simple-majority D. RB' = relative bias; Pn,~ = proportion findividuals favoring G in the high-bias condi- 
tion; PL,G = ideal proportion of individuals favoring G in the low-bias condition; D = the social decision 
scheme matrix; B = group bias; b = individual bias. 
(which are typically very highly correlated with jury verdict; 
e.g., Kerr, 1981). The individual (i.e., predeliberation) and 
group (i.e., postdeliberation)judgments are contrasted in Fig- 
ure 8. As the figure shows, following deliberation there was a 
significant polarization effect involving a shift toward greater 
guiltiness in the high guilt-appearance conditions and toward 
innocence in the low guilt-appearance conditions. However, 
there were no significant postdeliberation attorney obnoxious- 
ness biases in postdeliberation judgments; juries were less bi- 
ased than jurors (in our terminology, RB < 0). 
Reasoning from information i tegration theory (e.g., Ander- 
son, 1981 ), Kaplan has argued ( 1982; Kaplan and Miller, 1978; 
Kaplan & Schersching, 1980) that individual jurors' judgments 
are reached through the integration of many sources of infor- 
mation: personal predispositions (e.g., authoritarianism, gen- 
eral lack of sympathy for criminals, etc.), biasing extralegal fac- 
tors (e.g., liking for defendant orvictim, attitudes toward parties 
identified with them, like their counsel), and, most important, 
evidentiary factors. Furthermore, he has argued that jurors rec- 
ognize, either without reminder or through judicial instruc- 
tions, that biasing, extralegal material should not actually be 
considered. This recognition, he has argued, along with the 
greater amount of information available to the jury results in 
the content of jury deliberation being dominated by valid, ac- 
ceptable information (viz., evidentiary material). Since most 
of the new information to which a juror is exposed uring de- 
liberation would not be biasing, deliberating jurors' verdicts 
should be influenced more by theevidence and less by personal 
biases during than before deliberation. 
This line of argument suggests qualitative differences in the 
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Figure 8. Predeliberation a d postdeliberation guilt ratings from 
Kaplan and Miller ( 1978, Experiment 3 ). 
process of individual and group judgment. However, our present 
analysis predicts exactly the pattern of results observed by 
Kaplan and Miller (1978). We know from much research that 
juries tend to follow one or another variation on a majority- 
rules decision scheme (Davis, 1980; Stasser, Kerr, et al., 1989). 
And our analysis has indicated (see Figure 7 ) that if all partici- 
pants (in both the high and low bias conditions) are near a re- 
sponse pole (a result produced in Kaplan and Miller by the 
strength-of-evidence manipulation), then group judgment 
should be polarized and the error of commission bias in indi- 
viduals hould be attenuated in groups. Kaplan's theoretical s- 
sumption that jury deliberation successfully debiases juror 
thinking is not necessary.12 
Another thing we learn from the present theoretical nalysis 
is that whether groups are more or less biased than individuals 
can depend entirely on the way in which bias is defined (i.e., 
which type of judgmental sin is being shown). To see this, we 
return to our prospect-theory example (an instance in which 
Tversky & Kahneman [e.g., 1981] cleverly devised a paradigm 
that permitted a sin of imprecision demonstration). Weassume 
further that besides the very general risk-seeking-for-loss bias 
(which Tversky and Kahneman attribute to nonlinear utility 
functions), our participants also bring another, more personal 
bias (e.g., our participant pool is the local chapter of Gamblers 
Anonymous, whose members are predisposed to take risks). 
Under these assumptions, individuals would clearly display a 
risk-seeking bias (i.e., Pr~sky a/terra,iv,, > .5 ), and, as we have seen 
earlier ( see Figure 3A), groups operating under amajority-wins 
decision scheme would show an even larger bias. But suppose 
instead of comparing our participants' behavior to the unbiased 
criterion of indifference between alternatives, that is, I = (.5, .5 ) 
in a sin of imprecision paradigm, we decide to contrast condi- 
tions in which the outcomes are framed as losses versus framed 
as gains (i.e., in a sin of commission paradigm; cf. McGuire et 
al., 1987). Under our assumptions, if we randomly assign our 
gambler participants o loss-frame (high-bias) and gain-frame 
(low-bias) conditions, we would expect both conditions to gen- 
erally prefer risky alternatives (i.e., both PH,r~m,~t~r~,~,, and 
PL:~,k,,~t,,r,~,g~,, > .5 ), because of the dispositional bias for risk 
seeking in this participant population, and, in addition, we 
would expect o observe the original sin of commission (i.e., 
PH,riskv alternative > PL,riskyalternative) that stems ultimately from the 
nonlinearity ofthe utility function. Now, assume that groups of 
our gamblers rather than individual gamblers were to serve as 
judges and the majority-rules scheme were to summarize those 
groups' decision making. If the dispositional bias were strong 
enough (i.e., Pn,ri,'k,.,I,,,r,~,iv, and PL.riskyalternative begin to ap- 
proach the 1.0), our analysis hows that the original sin of com- 
mission effect would be attenuated within groups, exactly oppo- 
site to the conclusion that we reached in the SofI paradigm. 
The important conclusion isthat the way in which a particular 
bias is defined (e.g., SofI vs. SofC) can result in diametrically 
opposite conclusions about whether groups or individuals are 
more apt to display that bias, even when we are talking about a 
single unitary bias phenomenon a d the process of group deci- 
sion making is identical within each type-of-bias paradigm. 
Equ iprobab i l i ty  D. For completeness sake, we confirmed in 
the SofC case what had been evident in the SofI case: The net 
effect of the equiprobability process is to invert he patterns for 
RB observed under the majority-wins process. Figure 9 pre- 
sents the relevant results. Under equiprobability, only when all 
individuals are fairly extreme to begin with do groups magnify 
individual biases; the general rule (i.e., that RB < 0) else- 
where--that is,where at least one of the groups being compared 
is not extreme--is the opposite of the majority prediction i  the 
same regions. 
St rong ly  asymmetr i c  D. The results of our computer analy- 
sis for the strongly asymmetric decision scheme are plotted in 
Figure 10. Recall that the strongly asymmetric D matrix as- 
sumes a functional model for which the second alternative, NG, 
is (nearly fully) demonstrably "correct." Those with excep- 
tional spatial-reasoning abilities may be able to recognize the 
resulting RB'  surface in Figure 10A as a distortion of the corre- 
sponding majority-wins surface (i.e., Figure 7A); those with 
less than exceptional (e.g., normal) spatial-reasoning abilities 
might want to forego the exercise of mentally manipulating 3- 
D surfaces and just skip ahead to the next paragraph, where the 
net result of a strong asymmetry in D is described. The surface 
for the strongly asymmetrical D is just the majority-wins sur- 
face stretched and distorted toward the back left-hand corner of 
the 3-D plot, that is, toward the ( 1.0, 1.0) pole. The net result 
of such a distortion is summarized in Figure 10D and may be 
meaningfully compared with the corresponding fi ure for the 
majority-wins plot (i.e., Figure 7D). Adding a strong asymme- 
try to the basic majority-wins model enlarges the B < b area 
near the favored pole ( here, where Pc approaches 0) and shifts 
and compresses the middle B > b region toward the unfavored 
pole (i.e., toward the Pc = 1.0 pole; see Whyte, 1993, for a pos- 
sible illustration of behavior in the latter egion). In the present 
instance, the asymmetry is so strong that the other majority- 
rule B < b region--at the top of Figure 7D--becomes vanish- 
J2 Kaplan's RB prediction might well obtain if extralegal information 
were seen by nearly all jurors to be "demonstrably incorrect." That is, 
if there were a functional model of juror decision making that both pro- 
scribed using such information and met he other equirements forsuch 
a functional model (e.g., widely shared, willingly advocated, etc.), and 
if advocates for conviction were largely to base their positions on such 
information, then we might expect he extralegal bias to be weaker 
among roups. 
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Ftgure 9, Plots of(a) RB' as a function of(pH,~, PL,a) and (b) the RB' = 0 contour function under an 
equiprobability D. RB' = relative bias; p.,~ = proportion of individuals favoring G in the high-bias condi- 
tion; PL,~; = proportion of individuals favoring G in the low-bias condition; D = the social decision scheme 
matrix; B = group bias; b = individual bias. 
ingly small. Had the asymmetry been less pronounced, this re- 
gion could have survived as a small area. 
What  does this mean? That under Case 1 assumptions, when 
one direction is strongly favored by a functional model, judg- 
mental sins of commission will more often than not be less pro- 
nounced among groups than among individuals. Only when 
there are very few individual advocates of that favored position 
to be found should we expect groups to be more biased than in- 
dividuals (i.e., when mean individual judgment across the high- 
and low-bias conditions begins to approach the unfavored 
pole). 13 
The mock jury studies we have identified that examine both 
predeliberation juror and jury susceptibility to extralegal biases 
(see Table 1) each examine criminal, rather than civil, cases. 
Thus, it is important o note one "bias" that typically emerges 
during criminal jury del iberat ion--a so-called "leniency bias'" 
(see MacCoun & Kerr, 1988, for a review). There is a reliable 
asymmetry in criminal jury deliberation that gives factions ad- 
vocating acquittal better prospects of prevailing in the delibera- 
tion than equally sized factions favoring conviction. The net 
effect of this asymmetry is to make jury verdicts more lenient 
than juror verdicts (at least for reasonably close cases). Mac- 
Coun and Kerr ( 1988 ) have presented evidence that this effect is 
a product of common law norms for protecting the defendant 
~3 This relatively simple pattern in the SofC case contrasts with the 
rather more complicated patterns that arose in the corresponding Sofl 
case (see Figures 5A, 5B, and 5C). Once again, there is the potential for 
the same basic judgmental bias to produce very different RB values 
when it is framed as a sin of imprecision versus asin of commission. 
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Figure l O. Plots of ( a ) RB' as a function of ( pH.~, p~..a ) and ( b ) the RB' = O contour function u der the 
strongly asymmetric D. RB' = relative bias; Pn.a = proportion of individuals favoring G in the high-bias 
condition; PL,a = proportion of individuals favoring G in the low-bias condition; D = the social decision 
scheme matrix; B = group bias; b = individual bias. 
from false conviction, as reflected in the reasonable-doubt stan- 
dard of proof and the presumption of innocence requirement. 
Because such defendant-protection n rms (e.g., Davis, 1980) are 
prescribed by common law, the leniency "bias" is not, with our 
present definition of the term, really a bias at all. However, when 
examining the effects of deliberation on genuine xtralegal biases, 
it is important to anticipate that shifts toward acquittal are likely 
to occur in juries, even in the absence of other biases. 
Earlier we showed how juror bias should be attenuated in
juries operating under a simple-majority decision scheme only 
for trials that produced extreme verdict distributions (i.e., Pc 
near 0.0 and 1.0). But according to the present analysis, a le- 
niency "bias" would expand the former region upward from 
Pc near 0.0. Thus, if the leniency bias is strong (which appears 
to depend upon how juries are instructed; MacCoun & Kerr, 
1988), we might expect jury deliberation to attenuate bias 
even if the overall conviction rate is fairly moderate. Interest- 
ingly, besides Kaplan and Miller's (1978) study (discussed 
earlier), the only other study not to observe a clear, unequivo- 
cal bias-enhancing effect of jury deliberation is Thomp- 
son, Fong, & Rosenhan, ( 1981 ). Casting their findings in our 
present erminology, Thompson et al. found (Pn.c, PL,c) = 
(Ppro-prosecution i admissible evidence, G, Ppro-defense inadmissible evidenee,G ) = 
(.53, .38) and corresponding jury values of (Pn,a ,  PL,c) = 
(.39, .21 ). Statistically, one could not reject he hypothesis of 
equal degrees of bias by individuals and groups. This pattern 
of results is consistent with our model if Thompson et al 's  ju- 
ries had a moderately strong leniency bias, that is, with such a
degree of asymmetry, the observed (Pn,a, Pr .a)  could lie close 
.to the equal-bias contour curve. 
Summary.  When a majority-wins decision scheme (or 
some similar strength-in-numbers decision scheme) is likely to 
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apply (e.g., for clearly judgmental tasks), moving from individ- 
ual to group decision makers tends to exaggerate individual bi- 
ases of commission in groups (unless floor-ceiling effects 
intrude). ~4 Again, these patterns are reversed under group deci- 
sion processes with disproportionately low strength in numbers 
(e.g., equiprobability). For tasks with demonstrably correct al- 
ternatives (e.g., clearly intellective tasks), sins of commission 
are usually less pronounced in groups (unless the "incorrect" 
positions are extremely popular, in which case the reverse can 
be true). 
Sins of Omission (SofO) 
As far as our central question about relative bias is concerned, 
this is a simply handled case. A sin of omission means that the 
high- and low-bias conditions do not differ. If individuals in 
these two conditions tart at the same place (i.e., have the same 
7r vector) and group decision making is summarized by the 
same process in each condition (Case l's assumption of a single, 
constant D in all groups), then the SDS model predicts that 
groups in these two conditions must likewise end up at the same 
place. Hence, under Case 1 assumptions, a sin of omission in 
individuals must result in the same sin of omission in groups. 
(By identical logic, a sin of omission in groups must, under Case 
1 assumptions, imply an identical sin of omission in individu- 
als.) Thus, if there is any difference in individual and group sus- 
ceptibility to a sin of omission (and, as our earlier overview in- 
dicated, there certainly are; e.g., Wright & Wells, 1985; Wright, 
L/iris, & Christie, 1990), it can only mean that Case 1 assump- 
tions have been violated: We consider Case 2 next. 
Case 2: Varying Group-Judgment Processes 
Our assumption i  Case 1 of a single social decision-making 
process for all groups essentially means that for any given initial 
distribution of member preference (re, ruG), the relative ability 
of each faction to prevail in the coming group discussion is not 
altered by exposure to potentially biasing information. So, for 
example, under Case 1 assumptions, receiving prejudicial pre- 
trial publicity may increase a juror's chances of seeing the defen- 
dant as guilty, but it would not alter his or her ability, say, to resist 
a unanimous majority favoring acquittal in a jury beginning de- 
liberation with a (re, ruo.) = ( l 1, 1 ) split (relative to a compara- 
ble juror in a low-bias condition who had seen no such 
publicity). 
As we have seen, even under the simplifying Case 1 assump- 
tion, the relative degree of individual and group bias depends 
on a number of factors. But it is also quite possible that this 
assumption is false. Possession of certain information, per se, 
could actually alter the dynamics of the process of group judg- 
ment. In the preceding example, perhaps all other things (and 
especially the initial distribution of verdict preferences) being 
equal, a pro-conviction juror could be relatively more persua- 
sive, more resistant to persuasion, or both in the group setting 
when the jury has been exposed to prejudicial pretrial publicity 
than when it has not been so exposed. 
This is not a possibility in the sin of imprecision case, because 
there are no high- and low-bias conditions receiving different 
information for this type of bias. Rather, all individual and all 
group judges are given the same basic task information and their 
respective judgments are then compared to a standard efined 
by a normative model. It is, however, definitely a possibility for 
the other two types of bias; for both sin of commission and sin 
of omission it may be that Dn ~ DL. Of course, there are literally 
an infinite number of ways that this could occur. Later, we spec- 
ulate on the nature of such process differences, but first it is 
useful to examine a handful of studies that document that such 
differences do indeed occur. 
Sins of Commission (SofC) 
The most direct way to document such effects is to identify 
differences between the best-fitting or estimated D matrices for 
high- and low-bias groups. Unfortunately, there have been rela- 
tively few studies that have provided the data required to ex- 
plore this possibility. Furthermore, the amount of data required 
to provide convincing statistical evidence can be prohibitive.~S 
Nevertheless, we have identified three such studies that provide 
some fragmentary but suggestive evidence. 
Two of these studies examine xtralegal biases in jury deci- 
sion making. MacCoun (1990) examined the effect of defen- 
dant physical attractiveness on the verdicts of 4-person mock 
juries. The biasing effect of defendant appearance information 
was somewhat greater among juries (an effect of 18% on con- 
viction rate) than among individual jurors (an effect of 12%). 
This pattern is consistent with the predictions of the majority- 
wins primary scheme revealed in our Case 1 computer analy- 
ses. ~6 The observed frequencies of initial split to final verdict 
transitions are presented in Panel A of Table 4; the relative fre- 
quencies (by row ), provided in parentheses beneath the raw fre- 
quencies, represent the entries of the estimated D matrices for 
the high- and low-attractiveness defendant conditions. 
As noted previously, besides the usual majority-rules primary 
scheme, a fair amount of research as documented an asym- 
metric subscheme for criminal jury deliberation (see Stasser, 
Kerr, & Bray, 1982; MacCoun & Kerr, 1988). When there is no 
strong initial majority, pro-acquittal factions are more likely to 
prevail than comparable pro-conviction factions. For example, 
one meta-analysis ndicated that, on average, acquittal was 
~4 It is noteworthy that the general amplification ofbias produced by 
majority Ds occurs in precisely the same area (viz., nonextreme distri- 
butions of individual preference) where it would typically take a larger 
sample size to detect an effect among roups (see Nagao & Davis, 1980, 
Table 4). Again, power considerations can complicate the comparison 
of bias at the individual and group levels (Kenny et al., in press). 
15 For example, comparing D matrices for high- and low-bias 12-per- 
son juries requires estimation of at least 54 matrix entries (2 matrices, 
13 rows and 2 columns per matrix). Even if one could assume relatively 
uniform ~r vectors (which is implausible, because for any given distri- 
bution of individual preference, there are many unlikely initial splits), 
in order to have a minimum of 10 groups per row per matrix, one would 
need 3,120 participants (2 matrices × 13 rows/matrix X 10 groups/ 
row × 12 persons/group). 
J6 Under random composition of juries, the relatively small, 12% 
effect for attractiveness among jurors resulted in a much larger propor- 
tion of juries with an initial majority for acquittal when the defendant 
was physically attractive ( 12 / 25 or 41% ) than when he was unattractive 
(4/30 or 13%). 
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Table 4 
Data on Effects of Extralegal Biasing Information Affecting Jury Leniency Bias 
Outcome of jury deliberation 
Predeliberation 
verdict split High-bias condition Low-bias condition 
G NG G NG Hung G NG Hung 
MacCoun (1990) 
Panel A Low-attractive d fendant High-attractive d fendant 
4 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
(l.OO) (.00) (.00) (l.OO) (.00) (.00) 
3 1 7 2 6 3 2 6 
(.47) (. 13) (.40) (.27) (.18) (.55) 
2 2 3 3 6 0 4 0 
(.30) (.30) (.40) (.00) (1.00) (.00) 
1 3 1 3 0 1 5 2 
(.25) (.75) (0.0) (. 12) (.62) (.25) 
0 4 0 4 0 
(.oo) (l.OO) (.oo) 
Kramer et al. (1990) 
Panel B High-emotional publicity Low-emotional publicity 
5 1 3 0 2 1 0 0 
(.60) (.00) (.40) (.00) (.00) (.00) 
4 2 9 0 11 3 0 6 
(.45) (.00) (.55) (.33) (.00) (.67) 
3 3 6 4 8 0 2 9 
(.33) (.22) (.44) (.00) (. 18) (.82) 
2 4 0 5 7 0 9 2 
(.00) (.42) (.58) (.00) (.82) (. 18) 
1 5 0 1 2 0 4 0 
(.00) (.33) (.67) (.00) (1.00) (.00) 
Note. G = guilty; NG = not guilty. Numbers in parentheses are relative frequencies (by row). 
about four times as likely as conviction for juries that were 
evenly split prior to deliberation (MacCoun & Kerr, 1988 ). In- 
spection of MacCoun's (1990) data in Table 4 suggests that this 
asymmetry bias was evident when the defendant was attractive 
but not when the defendant was unattractive. This is seen most 
directly in the evenly split juries (2G, 2NG). When the defen- 
dant was attractive, all such groups acquitted the defendant; 
when the defendant was unattractive, only 30% (3 of 10) of the 
juries acquitted. To a lesser extent, the comparison of pro- and 
anti-conviction majority juries with initial 3-1 splits reveals the 
same pattern. When the defendant was attractive, pro-acquittal 
majorities were more likely to prevail than comparably sized 
pro-conviction majorities (.62 - .27 = .35); the comparable 
figure in the unattractive defendant condition was somewhat 
lower ( .75 - .47 = .28). When one drops hung juries, this trend 
is even clearer: (5 /6  - 3/5 = .23) versus (3 /4  - 7 /9 = - .03) .  
Although these differences are small and, given these small sam- 
pies, not statistically significant, hey are intriguing. They sug- 
gest that the usual willingness to give the defendant the benefit 
of the doubt (e.g., when there is no clear consensus in the group )
is attenuated when that defendant isphysically unattractive. 
This suggestion is bolstered by a similar pattern of data in 
Kramer, Kerr, and Carroll's (1990) study of the biasing effects 
of pretrial publicity. The relevant estimated social decision 
schemes are presented in Panel B of Table 4. Kramer et al. ex- 
amined (among other things) the biasing effects of emotional 
pretrial publicity) 7 And, just as in MacCoun's (1990) data, 
there are indications that the usual and legally prescribed pro- 
defendant leniency bias is attenuated when jurors were exposed 
to prejudicial emotional pretrial publicity. Consider the third 
row of the lower half of Table 4. In low-emotion publicity juries, 
when evenly split juries managed to reach verdicts, they were 
acquittals (2 acquittals, 0 convictions). However, an unusual 
trend in the opposite direction occurred in the high-emotion 
juries (6 convictions, 4 acquittals). Likewise in the fourth row, 
we see that acquittal was relatively less likely (particularly in 
comparison to hung juries) given an initial pro-acquittal major- 
ity in the high-emotion publicity juries than in the low-emotion 
juries. The association between initial split and verdict in these 
rows was marginally (p < .07) significant. 
A third illustration uses the sin of commission approach to 
~7 Again, the primary majority scheme may also contribute to the 
differences between jurors and juries in sensitivity o emotional public- 
ity (which produced the stronger biasing effect among jurors). For ex- 
ample, pro-conviction i itial majorities were quite a bit more likely to 
occur in high emotional pretrial publicity (PTP) groups (43% of the 
time) than in low-emotion juries (only 28% ). 
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demonstrate he framing biases predicted by prospect theory. 
McGuire et al., (1987) found very weak framing effects among 
individuals but rather robust framing effects among groups. 
Qualitatively, this is fairly consistent with the predictions of a 
uniform-majority primary scheme. However, McGuire et al. 
also obtained irect estimates of the operative Ds in the high- 
and low-bias conditions (viz., the gain- and loss-frame con- 
ditions). These estimates, which are similar in structure to 
those described above for jury deliberations, are presented in 
the top panel of Table 5 and suggest hat the stronger bias in 
groups could be attributed, at least in part, to different D ma- 
trices for the two framing conditions. The most striking differ- 
ences can be seen in the middle two rows. Clearly, when the 
problem was framed as a gain problem, risk-averse factions 
(i.e., composed of those who initially favored taking the sure 
gain) usually prevailed ( 77% of the time), but this was true even 
when the faction was a minority of one (which prevailed 83% 
of the time). Exactly the opposite occurred for the loss framing; 
risk-seeking factions usually prevailed (80% of the time), even 
when it was a single advocate opposing a majority of two (75% 
of the time). Again, the sample sizes are small and the effects 
weak ( distributional differences within the middle two rows re- 
sulted in ps <.  11 by Fiscber's exact ests). 
McGuire et al. (1987) speculated that arguments advocating 
the attitudes toward risk predicted by prospect theory--namely, 
for risky choices under a loss frame and for more certain choices 
under a gain frame--are "demonstrably correct" in Laughlin's 
sense. That is, prospect theory may here be a potent functional 
model of collective judgment, This claim was bolstered by con- 
]'able 5
McGuire et al. (1987) Data on Eff~'cts of Framing Information 
A/letting Group Decision Making 
Prediscussion 
preference 
distribution Gain frame Loss frame 
Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk 
averse seek ing  averse  seek ing  averse  seeking 
Group decision-face-to-face discussion 
3 0 1 0 2 0 
(1.00) (.00) (1.00) COO) 
2 1 5 2 2 6 
(.71) (.29) (2.5) (.75) 
1 2 5 1 0 2 
(.83) (.17) (.00) (1.00) 
0 3 1 0 0 3 
(~.00) (.00) (.00) (1.00) 
Group decision-computer-assisted di cussion 
3 0 4 1 3 0 
(.80) (.20) (1.00) (.00) 
2 1 0 4 2 3 
(.00) (~.00) (.40) (.60) 
1 2 1 3 2 3 
(.25) (.75) (.40) (.60) 
0 3 1 1 0 2 
(.50) (.50) (.00) (1.00) 
Note. Numbers in parentheses indicate relative frequencms. 
trasting the above results, which were obtained in face-to-face 
discussion groups, with another condition in which all commu- 
nication between group members took place via a computer net- 
work. The corresponding data for this latter condition are pre- 
sented in the bottom panel of Table 5. It seems likely that it was 
more difficult for group members to communicate with one an- 
other in the computer-assisted-communication condition. Such 
difficulty seems likely to undermine group members' ability to 
advocate and recognize their shared conceptual system (which 
maintains that a sure gain is better than an uncertain one, and a 
chance to avoid a loss is preferable to a sure loss) and, thus, the 
"correctness" of the choices prescribed by that system. And in- 
deed, there is little evidence of difference in the estimated D ma- 
trices between the two framing conditions. 
Sins of Omission (SolO) 
To our knowledge, no studies have directly estimated D1t and 
Dr separately within an experimental demonstration f a sin of 
omission by groups. There is one study, however, that provides 
strong indirect evidence that the availability of prescribed infor- 
mation can alter the group decision-making process. Wright et 
al. (1990) found that individuals failed to use prescribed con- 
sensus information (i.e., when deciding whether aparticular be- 
havior was attributable to internal, dispositional factors or to 
external, situational factors, individuals paid no attention to 
whether many (high-consensus) or few (low-consensus) people 
acted as the target person did. An unbiased judge should attri- 
bute the target's behavior more readily to situational factors in 
the former, high-consensus case. Wright et al. (1990) found, 
however, that groups did use such consensus information prop- 
erly: Group discussion appears to have corrected the sin of 
omission committed by individual judges. If the individuals 
tended to use consensus information properly but to do so very 
weakly and nonsignificantly, then this pattern could be un- 
derstood to be the simple result of a majority-wins scheme. 
However, not only did individuals show no effect for consensus 
information, the nonsignificant trend was opposite to the pre- 
scribed irection. This pattern of results is hard to explain un- 
der Case 1 assumptions and strongly implies that Case 2 as- 
sumptions hold here (i.e., a different group decision-making 
process occurred in the high- and low-consensus information 
conditions). Other results by Wright et al. further supported 
this possibility. They found that not just face-to-face group dis- 
cussion but reading a transcript of another group's discussion 
or a set of arguments generated by individuals also produced 
the prescribed use of consensus information. Working from Vi- 
nokur and Burnstein's (1973) persuasive arguments theory, 
they suggest that consensus information is highly potent 
("demonstrably correct" in Laughlin's [Laughlin & Ellis 
( 1986)] terminology) but that relatively few participants pos- 
sess such information. Group discussion gives the opportunity 
for this potent information to be shared and, in Wright et al.'s, 
like many SofC and SofO paradigms, the information provided 
in the two experimental conditions prescribes opposite judg- 
ments. This suggests that groups beginning deliberation with 
ostensibly comparable initial splits are likely to move in oppo- 
site directions in the two experimental conditions ( much as oc- 
curred in McGuire et al., 1987; see Table 5 ). In effect, this sug- 
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gests that different D matrices described groups in these two 
conditions, and it was this difference in process that was (at least 
in part) responsible for reducing the SofO bias in groups. 
General  Discussion and Conclusions 
The central question of this paper has been, "Which is more 
likely to make a biased judgment, individuals or groups?" Our 
overview of the relatively small and diverse mpirical literature 
suggested that there was no simple empirical answer to this 
question. Even when we restrict our attention to particular bias 
phenomena (e.g., framing effects, preference reversals), there 
was frequently little consistency in the direction (i.e., sign) and 
magnitude of observed relative bias, RB. 
Although there appeared to be no simple and general empir- 
ical answer to our question, the present heoretical analysis 
based on the social decision scheme model has revealed many 
partial answers, all of which begin with "Well, it de- 
pends . . . .  " Even under the simplifying assumption that 
the same basic group process characterizes all groups (Case 1 
assumption), we have shown that (and how) it depends jointly 
upon several factors. In particular, it depends on: 
1. The size of the group: Generally, as group size increases, the 
sign of RB is unaffected, but its magnitude increases. (It can 
also be shown that the latter relationship between group size 
and RB is a monotonic, negatively accelerating one; cf. Latan6, 
1981). 
2. The magnitude of individual bias: All other things being 
equal (and most particularly, under any one of several possible 
group processes), both the direction and magnitude of RB can 
vary as one varies only the magnitude of individual bias. 
3. The location of the bias: All other things being equal, both 
the direction and magnitude of RB can change with the location 
in the response domain (e.g., the locations ofp, ,6  and PL:; for 
sins of commission) of an individual bias of constant 
magnitude. 
4. The definition of the bias: All other things being equal, one 
can come to diametrically opposite conclusions about RB de- 
pending on how bias has been defined (e.g., as a sin of im- 
precision vs. a sin of commission). 
5. The normative ideal: As the ideal judgment shifts, RB can 
(for sins of imprecision) change both sign and magnitude, ven 
if individual preference and group process remain constant. 
6. The nature of the group process: Most important, all other 
things being equal, different group processes can produce dra- 
matically different RBs. If the particular judgment task deter- 
mined group process completely (and, as much research as 
shown, task features uch as how judgmental-intellective th  
task is appear to have profound impact on the nature of the 
group decision-making process), then this factor at least would 
not contribute to variance in RB for any particular bias phe- 
nomenon. But since such situational, group, or personal factors 
as the importance of the task, the importance ofintragroup har- 
mony, or the judge's general level of uncertainty may also in- 
fluence the nature of the group process, it is not safe to presume 
that group process is fixed by task demands. 
Also note that all of these complex (but tractable) patterns 
assume that in any given group and task context, group process 
(as summarized by D) is constant. When we relax this assump- 
tion, many other patterns are possible. Given the extreme diver- 
sity of bias phenomena, group sizes, ways of operationalizing 
bias, experimental contexts, etc., in the empirical literature at a 
global evel, it is, in retrospect, hardly surprising that this liter- 
ature does not show a simple, consistent pattern of relative bias. 
Of course, we ask more of a theory than that it correctly pre- 
dicts that nature can be complex. A good theory ought to help 
reduce that complexity: by resolving apparent empirical anom- 
alies, by posing informative new questions, by directing practi- 
cal application, and by guiding where to look and what to look 
for. We conclude by discussing how well the present theoretical 
model satisfies these criteria. 
Organizing Past Findings 
The biggest stumbling block to applying our analysis retro- 
spectively is in knowing exactly what kind of group processes to 
assume. In most of the bias phenomena that have been studied, 
there has been relatively little research using groups as judges, 
and almost none of this work has tested or estimated (Kerr, 
Stasser, & Davis, 1979 ) D-matrix summaries of group-decision 
process. The one clear exception is research examining jurors 
and juries committing judgmental sins of commission. Consid- 
erable research (see Davis, 1980; Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; Mac- 
Coun & Kerr, 1988; Stasser et al., 1982) has established that 
criminal juries' deliberations are summarized by a high-order 
majority primary decision scheme (e.g., initial two-thirds ma- 
jorities nearly always prevail) with a subscheme (applying when 
there is no strong initial majority) that asymmetrically favors 
acquittal. From the preceding theoretical analysis, it follows 
that jury deliberation ought o amplify juror sins of commission 
unless the conviction rate for jurors is very extreme (i.e., Pu,G 
and PL.~ approach 0 or 1.0), although less extremity (i.e., pn,~ 
and PL,~ near or just below .50) could still result in attenuation 
of bias due to the leniency "bias" The relevant empirical liter- 
ature (see Table 1 ) is basically consistent with this postdiction; 
generally, juries appear to be more sensitive to proscribed infor- 
mation than jurors, and the few exceptions to this rule appear 
to occur where the theory anticipates them (e.g., Kaplan and 
Miller, 1978, used cases with extreme conviction rates). 
Our theoretical analysis can also be applied to organizing 
findings on topics other than the comparison of biased judg- 
ment in individuals and groups. For example, our analyses may 
have implications for the ongoing debate (e.g., Camerer, 1992; 
Hogarth & Reder, 1987; Thaler, 1991 ) about he descriptive va- 
lidity of the rational-choice model, which plays such a central 
role in modern economics, political science, and public policy 
analysis. Many economists have disputed the significance of 
empirical violations of rational-choice assumptions, offering a 
number of reasons why laboratory demonstrations might un- 
derestimate human rationality in real-life settings. One such ar- 
gument has been that collective decision making should cancel 
out judgmental errors. Though this may be correct for aggregate 
public opinion (Page & Shapiro, 1992), it is premised on a sta- 
tistical analogy--the law of large numbers--that is dearly in- 
compatible with actual interactive group decision making under 
some likely social decision schemes (e.g., simple majority wins, 
truth wins, truth-supported wins). More important, his argu- 
ment does not apply to judgmental biases--the topic of this ar- 
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ticle--which are systematic rather than random. At best, our 
analyses offer an existence proof that collective rationality can 
sometimes be superior to individual rationality, but they also 
suggest that over a large and plausible region of relevant param- 
eter space, group decision making actually exacerbates the bi- 
ases observed in individual decisions. 
Posing New Questions 
of  course, successful prediction is generally more satisfying 
than apparently successful postdiction. The preceding theoreti- 
cal analysis uggests many new and testable hypotheses that 
ought to be systematically tested (e.g., that the effect of jury 
deliberation on an extralegal sin-of-commission bias will de- 
pend on the overall strength of evidence against a defendant). 
Moreover, when a particular D can be estimated or confidently 
assumed, this approach does not make only ordinal predictions 
that one condition will be more biased than another, but makes 
specific point predictions over an entire domain of model 
parameters. 
Our original question was essentially posed in terms of the 
outcome of individual versus group judgment. But our analysis 
( like so many other previous theoretical nalyses of group phe- 
nomena; e.g., Zajonc, 1965; Myers & Lamm, 1976; Burnstein 
& Vinokur, 1977) refocuses our attention away from outcome 
and toward process. That is, away from the question, "which is 
more biased, individual or group judgment?" and toward the 
question, "what are the processes whereby individual prefer- 
ences are translated into group preferences?" And a social deci- 
sion scheme perspective on the latter broad question raises ev- 
eral other fundamental questions: 
1. "What factors determine the operative social decision 
scheme, D?" A number of such factors have been identified 
(including the judgmental-intellective nature of the task, task 
uncertainty, task importance), but undoubtedly many more re- 
main to be identified. One promising way of identifying such 
factors may be to examine variables (like those in Appendix A ) 
that are known and can be shown to affect group information 
processing. 
2. "When and why will the availability of certain information 
alter D; that is, when and why must we abandon the simplifying 
Case 1 assumptions of a single social decision scheme describ- 
ing all groups?" Ultimately, this raises fundamental questions 
of how individuals pool and use information i  groups. Once 
again, processes like those listed in Appendix A seem like good 
starting points for research. For example, groups eem to have 
difficulty accessing information that is not widely shared among 
members. This suggests that we need to be concerned not only 
with the mean impact of biasing information on individual 
preference, but on how that biasing information isdistributed 
among roup members. It is conceivable for a bit of biasing in- 
formation to have a clear effect on mean individual judgment, 
yet, because it is not widely shared among group members, to 
have little effect in the group. Such a pattern could be manifest 
by the process of group decision making (i.e., as summarized 
by the d0) being different for those with versus without such 
information (i.e., by the need to make Case 2 assumptions). 
3. "What do patterns in the operative decision scheme tell us 
about he existence and nature of a functional model of group 
judgment?" We suspect that clear asymmetries in D are espe- 
cially interesting and informative in this regard. Such asymme- 
tries usually suggest that there is some kind of functional model 
operating: what Laughlin (e.g., Laughlin & Ellis, 1986 ) termed 
a "shared conceptual system" and Tindale (e.g., 1993) termed 
a "shared representation." 
4. "What does the process of individual judgment imply about 
the functional model of group judgment (and vice versa) ?" 
5. "When a particular normative model is defensible and 
groups' functional model departs ubstantially from that nor- 
mative model, how can groups be induced to modify their func- 
tional model toward the normative model?" 
At present we have only fragmentary answers to these funda- 
mental questions. 
As noted earlier, our present analysis has been focused on 
biased judgment, but there is nothing in that analysis to pre- 
clude applying it to exploring the relative degree to which indi- 
viduals versus groups use any information, proscribed or not. If 
one can determine whether individuals use certain information 
and one can estimate the relevant D matrix or matrices, then 
one can show whether groups or individuals are more likely to 
make use of a piece of diagnostic nformation. So, for example, 
Davis et al. (1974) found that in choosing between bets, groups 
were even more sensitive to relevant bet parameters than were 
individuals, a result hat followed directly from the additional 
finding that these groups operated under a majority social deci- 
sion scheme. 
Directing Practical Application 
Although we have argued that groups will amplify bias under 
some conditions but attenuate it under others, readers will note 
that we predict enhanced bias within a region oftbe parameter 
space that is likely to characterize many real-world group deci- 
sion tasks; specifically, sins of commission by groups operating 
under majority-rule decision schemes (as long as individual 
judgment is not too extreme). Again, these decision schemes 
tend to apply to judgment tasks with no clearly shared concep- 
tual scheme for defining right or wrong answers (Laughlin & 
Ellis, 1986; McGrath, 1984: Stasser, Kerr, et al., 1989); promi- 
nent examples include jury decision making, hiring decisions, 
risky investment decisions, and foreign policy decisions of the 
type examined by Janis (1982). 
Thus, our analyses might be taken to imply that group deci- 
sion making is ill-advised for this large and important class of 
real-world ecision tasks. But quite apart from many other ea- 
sons for preferring roup to individual decision makers, ~8 our 
analysis also suggests a strategy for mitigating the bias-amplify- 
ing tendencies of groups at such tasks. Ultimately, bias as we 
have conceived it reflects decisions about whether and how to 
~8 For example, compared to individuals, groups tend to attenuate 
unsystematic, random errors (see Page & Shapiro, 1992; Zajonc, 1962 ), 
to better satisfy ideals of procedural fairness and legitimacy (e.g., Mac- 
Coun & Tyler, 1988), and to enhance the chances of collective mobili- 
zation (Rosenwein & Campbell, 1992). Furthermore, a number of ex- 
plicit procedures have been recommended forencouraging thorough 
information gathering and consideration a d for promoting unbiased 
judgment in groups ( e.g., Janis, 1982: Stasser &Stewart, 1992 ). 
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use information. Group discussion can modify such decisions 
made by individual members. Presumably, in the absence of a 
compelling functional model of judgment identifying one par- 
ticular alternative as "correct," these decisions too are made un- 
der a majority-strength-in-numbers d cision scheme. This sug- 
gests that if the majority of individuals recognize and accept he 
normative use of particular information, that groups are more 
likely to choose to use that information properly. This reasoning 
underscores the value of  teaching principles of rational, norma- 
tive judgment hrough general education and special training 
(e.g., Arkes, 1991; Nisbett, 1993; Shafir et al., 1993) - -o f  mak- 
ing defensible normative models into operative functional 
models for most (but not necessarily all) individuals. 
Guiding Where to Look  and What  to Look  for  
The SDS analysis advanced here offers a conceptual frame- 
work within which to identify and analyze individual-group 
differences in the use of normatively significant information. 
But, in addition, it provides very useful methodological tools, 
the foremost of which is using one or more D matrices to sum- 
marize the process of group information processing. Several 
methods for estimating or competitively testing potential D ma- 
trices have been developed (see Kerr et al., 1979). Using such 
methods, it is possible empirically to determine whether one 
can or cannot safely make Case 1 assumptions, to detect asym- 
metries that are the signatures of interesting functional models, 
and to make not just qualitative but quantitative predictions 
about relative bias. Thus, estimation of the operative D matrix 
ought to be a routine feature of empirical studies comparing 
individual and group bias. Such methods can be very usefully 
augmented by direct manipulations of such factors as the com- 
position of the group (e.g., Tindale et al., 1993 ) or the content 
(e.g., Wright et al., 1990) and communication modality (e.g., 
McGuire et al., 1987) of intragroup communication and by di- 
rect assessments of the demonstrability of correctness of judg- 
ment alternatives (e.g., Laughlin & Ellis, 1986 ). 
Conclusions 
As long as we continue routinely to rely upon groups to make 
important decisions, it is important o minimize demonstrable 
bias in group judgment. We have attempted to show several 
things in this article: (a) that there can be no simple answer to 
the question, "Which is more biased, individuals or groups?"; 
(b) that the social decision scheme model offers a framework for 
identifying and analyzing individual versus group differences in 
judgment; and (c) that using that framework, we can now spec- 
ify some of the conditions under which groups are both more 
and less biased than individuals. 
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Append ix  A 
I l lus t ra t ions  o f  P rocesses  Ar i s ing  in In terpersona l -Group Context  
Group task demands 
• Concern with maintaining group harmony 
• Impression-management co cerns 
• Need to achieve consensus ( atisfy decision rule) 
• Style of deliberation 
• Etc . . . .  
Effects of group context and capacity on information processing 
Group attention 
• Distraction 
• Social loafing 
• Social facilitation 
• Etc . . . .  
Group encoding 
• Social priming 
• Social consensus on meaning 
• Etc . . . .  
Group storage 
• Multiple, parallel storage 
• Transactive, distributed memory 
• Etc . . . .  
Group retrieval 
• Socially cued recall 
• Multiple parallel recall 
• Transactive, distributed recall 
• Retrieval bias against unshared information 
• Etc . . . .  
Group processing 
• Parallel processing 
• Assembly effect bonuses 
• Error checking 
• Integration of multiple judgments 
• Demonstrability of solutions 
• Production blocking 
• Social comparison of judgments 
• Etc . . . .  
Group consensus requirements-Processes 
• Compliance/conformity 
• Compromise alternatives 
• Accede to implicit or explicit decision rule 
• Etc . . . .  
Append ix  B 
Generat ing  the  Asymmetr ic  Soc ia l  Dec is ion  Scheme Mat r ix  
The function used to generate the elements of a strongly asymmetric 
social decision scheme was 
~(X - ,~)e a a~ when X -< a, 
diA = (a l )  
( l -a ) (X - -a )¢+a when X ~ a, 
(l - ~)e 
where 
(riA, rm)=(r  + l -- i , i - -  1), 
In these computations, a and K were free parameters, where 0 < a < 
1.0 and Kcould take on a nonnegative integer value. When a = .50, the 
D matrix was symmetric. For a < .5, the resulting asymmetry favored 
alternative G, while a > .5 resulted in an asymmetry favoring alterna- 
tive NG. The value of a also represented the inflection point in the 
function in Equation 4. In the present study, the strongly asymmetric D 
matrix used a = .85. The smaller the K value, the smoother, less in- 
flected the function in Equation 4. When K = 0, this function simply 
becomes the proportionality decision scheme (i.e., # = 1 and din = x, 
the proportion of group members advocating alternative A); as K 
~,  this function approaches a tep-function breaking at a; for example, 
simple majority is produced when a = .5 and K = oo. In the strongly 
asymmetric D used in this article, K = 5. 
( i -1 )  
= - - ,  and 
r 
1 
f3 = x+-"""--7"2K 
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